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ABSTRACT 
 Spontaneous volunteers who conduct search and rescue (SAR) in the aftermath of 
major disasters are changing the emergency management landscape. This thesis explores 
ways in which the United States Coast Guard (USCG) could better engage organized 
spontaneous volunteers (OSV) who conduct maritime SAR during hurricane response 
operations. The research involves three exploratory case studies. In each case study, the 
organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs was examined according to the 
Disaster Research Center’s four-fold typology of organized responses to disasters. The 
analysis identified specific factors of the USCG’s organizational response that affected 
OSV engagement. Recommendations are made for the USCG to take on new or 
non-regular SAR tasks and to develop new organizational structures to respond 
effectively to maritime disasters. New organizational structures should also include OSV 
groups if the USCG desires to increase engagement during future hurricane response 
operations. 
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Spontaneous volunteers who conducted search and rescue (SAR) in the aftermath 
of major hurricanes, such as Katrina in 2005, Harvey and Irma in 2017, and Florence and 
Michael in 2018, are changing the emergency management landscape because they self-
organize and conduct independent SAR operations. Additionally, organized spontaneous 
volunteer (OSV) groups are not well understood and official response organizations 
struggle to engage them effectively during disasters. These OSVs can and should be 
leveraged during disasters, as they provide a surge capacity to an already strained disaster 
response system. However, failure to understand how an official organization’s response 
to disasters can affect the engagement and actions of spontaneous volunteers detracts from 
the overall disaster response effort, as official responders try to respond to the disaster itself 
and address the influx of spontaneous volunteers. 
Spontaneous volunteers who emerge during disasters carry out many tasks that aid 
response and recovery operations. However, groups that self-organize and conduct 
independent SAR during hurricanes, such as the Cajun Navy, pose these same challenges 
for the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and other established SAR organizations. The 
USCG should embrace these challenges, learn from past events, and prepare for the ever-
increasing influx of spontaneous volunteers by understanding how their own organizational 
response to disasters affects spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions to incorporate 
OSV groups better into future hurricane responses. Additionally, a surge in spontaneous 
volunteerism is not exclusive to hurricanes. Emergency management officials and 
emergency responders at all levels of government should be prepared for an influx of 
spontaneous volunteers during any disaster, and should also seek to understand how their 
own organizational response affects spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions. 
While spontaneous volunteer motivations can vary, and an organized spontaneous 
volunteer response to disasters is often difficult to recognize and prepare for (especially as 
they embrace social media and other digital technologies to self-organize, communicate, 
and coordinate their actions), one thing is clear. Spontaneous volunteers are going to 
respond to disasters, yet spontaneous volunteer groups continue to be disregarded by 
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official response organizations, despite the value they may provide, or substantial effort is 
expended attempting to incorporate them into existing command and control systems.1  
Recent disaster research studies have highlighted that during disasters, a rigid top-
down command and control process is routinely being substituted for a more collaborative 
model of response.2 If official response organizations want to increase coordination efforts 
with spontaneous volunteers during future disaster response operations, they need a better 
understanding of how their own organizational response to disasters affects the 
coordination efforts and actions of spontaneous volunteers. 
The research question for this thesis is: How can the United States Coast Guard 
better engage organized spontaneous volunteers who conduct maritime search and rescue 
during hurricane response operations? 
To answer this research question, an exploratory case study methodology was used 
to analyze the organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs who conducted 
maritime SAR operations during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Harvey in 2017, 
and the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11. 
The studies were structured using the four tasks routinely carried out by the USCG 
during SAR missions: distress monitoring and communications, search planning and 
preparedness, SAR coordination, and SAR operations. Once SAR tasks were identified, an 
analysis was conducted to determine what factors contributed to or hindered the SAR 
response efforts of each organization. Additionally, the organizational response of both the 
USCG and OSVs was analyzed using the Disaster Research Center’s (DRC’s) four-fold 
 
1 Lauren M. Sauer et al., “The Utility of and Risks Associated with the Use of Spontaneous Volunteers 
in Disaster Response: A Survey,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 8, no. 1 (February 
2014): 65–69, https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2014.12; Joshua Whittaker, Blythe McLennan, and John 
Handmer, “A Review of Informal Volunteerism in Emergencies and Disasters: Definition, Opportunities 
and Challenges,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13 (September 2015): 358–68, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.07.010. 
2 Russell R. Dynes, E. L. Quarantelli, and Dennis Wenger, Individual and Organizational Response to 
the 1985 Earthquake in Mexico City, Mexico, DRC Book and Monograph Series, no. 24 (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center, 1990), 115, http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/2259; 
Nancy Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior during Disaster Response and 
Recovery Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
5504. 
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typology of organized responses to disasters. This analysis was used to identify specific 
factors of the USCG’s organizational response that affected OSV engagement.  
The DRC typology is a quadrant based on tasks (regular or non-regular tasks) and 
structures (existing or new). Based on the structures and tasks, Table 1 depicts four types 
of groups (established, extending, expanding, and emergent). 
Table 1. DRC Typology of Organized Responses to Disasters.3 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
  
 
This DRC typology analysis was conducted by examining the SAR tasks identified 
in each case study to determine if they were regular or non-regular tasks for the 
organization carrying them out, as well as if the organizational structures used to carry out 
each SAR task were in place prior to the disaster, or if they were created as a result of the 
disaster itself. Ultimately, this DRC typology analysis led to a typology identification for 
each organization during each event. The intent of this analysis and typology identification 
was to ascertain if certain USCG organizational responses were more conducive than 
others were for engaging OSVs. 
When the organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs was analyzed 
across all three case studies, several findings emerged: 
 
3 Source: E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, Different Types of Organizations in Disaster 
Responses and Their Operational Problems, Preliminary Papers, No. 41 (Newark, DE: University of 
Delaware, Disaster Research Center, 1977), 2, http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/414; Havidán 
Rodríguez, Joseph Trainor, and Enrico L. Quarantelli, “Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The 
Emergent and Prosocial Behavior Following Hurricane Katrina,” The ANNALS of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 604, no. 1 (2006): 85, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716205284677. 
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• Neither organization was able to respond to any of the disasters and 
perform maritime SAR functions as an established organization. This 
finding makes sense for OSV groups that do not conduct SAR tasks daily, 
where any SAR tasks undertaken are by default non-regular tasks for the 
group.  
• OSV groups emerged as a direct result of the disasters themselves, which 
required their organizational structures to be developed on the spot, and 
according to the needs of each event.  
• The fact that the USCG did not respond as an established organization to 
perform SAR tasks, which the organization conducts daily, during disaster 
response operations, was quite interesting. In all three case studies, the 
USCG had to take on non-regular tasks to carry out traditional SAR 
functions.  
• The USCG took on new or non-regular tasks to carry out three of the four 
SAR tasks routinely carried out by the USCG during SAR missions, with 
the exception of search planning and preparedness, which the USCG 
conducted as a regular task prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey. 
• In two of the three cases studied, the USCG had to develop new 
organizational structures to carry out these non-regular tasks. According to 
the DRC typology of organized responses to disasters, if an organization 
takes on non-regular tasks and develops new organizational structures to 
carry out those tasks, it is then considered an emergent group. This finding 
is consistent with those of this research that identified the USCG as an 
emergent group during both the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11 and 
Hurricane Harvey. However, what is unique is why the USCG became an 
emergent group during the lower Manhattan Boat Lift, by developing 
organizational structures external to the USCG and included OSVs, 
whereas during Hurricane Harvey, the USCG became an emergent group 
xxi 
by developing organizational structures internal to the USCG and did not 
included OSVs.  
Ultimately, this research determined that the USCG is not able to respond 
effectively as an existing group to carry out SAR tasks during maritime disasters, and at a 
minimum, would need to conduct either new or non-regular tasks, or most likely, would 
need to create new structures to carry out new or non-regular tasks. The challenge is finding 
ways to integrate OSVs effectively into disaster response operations. The USCG can better 
engage OSVs who conduct maritime SAR during hurricane response operations by seeking 
out innovative and new ways to respond to disasters organizationally, with the goal of 
becoming an emergent group itself. As an emergent group, new organizational structures 
would be developed that include OSVs to carry out new or non-regular tasks as part of the 
emergent group transition process. While the notion of developing new organizational 
structures that include OSVs to enhance engagement during hurricane response operations 
seems simple, in reality, several barriers must still be overcome: 
• First, the USCG responds to disasters as part of a national response 
strategy using the National Incident Management System. This system 
relies on the Incident Command System (ICS) to define roles and 
structures for responding organizations. The use of ICS is one of the major 
inhibitors of OSV engagement, and future studies should be conducted on 
the application and use of ICS during disaster response operations to 
develop strategies for incorporating OSVs outside of typical ICS 
structures. 
• Another barrier is the ambiguity of the USCG’s role during disasters that 
require maritime SAR operations in support of a national response 
strategy. To understand the USCG’s role better during disasters that 
require maritime SAR, a comprehensive review of national response 
strategies should be conducted. This review should focus on addressing 
the USCG’s role to support state and local agencies during disasters, yet 
xxii 
still fulfill its statutory requirements to conduct SAR missions as an 
independent SAR organization. 
• Finally, the natural evolution of digital technologies, and specifically, the 
widespread adoption and use of social media, is affecting how individuals 
reach out for help during disasters. The USCG should work to develop 
policies and procedures for officially receiving distress notifications 
through social media, for both routine and disaster related operations, and 
should work to develop consistent mechanisms to collect and aggregate 
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Imagine you live in a coastal area susceptible to hurricanes and it has been a very 
active hurricane season. You have been tracking an approaching storm for days; however, 
you were not able to evacuate. Now imagine you weather the brunt of the storm, only to 
discover you are still in danger. High tropical storm force winds are not the only danger 
associated with hurricanes; these storms can also produce significant storm surges, heavy 
rainfall, and inland flooding. 
You have survived the storm’s direct impact, but are still faced with the threat of 
rising floodwaters. Water is already three feet deep throughout your first floor and 
continues to rise. You decide to call for help, but cannot reach anyone because emergency 
call centers are overloaded, and emergency response organizations are overtaxed and 
unable to deploy more resources. In a desperate attempt for help, you turn to social media, 
and discover a group of citizens with shallow water boats has emerged to help conduct 
rescue operations. You contact an individual from this group who sends a boat and team 
of volunteers to evacuate you and your family. Once rescued, and out of harm’s way, you 
reflect on the following questions: does it matter that a government response organization 
was unable to rescue you? Should you have waited for official responders? Did this 
emergent group of volunteers make your situation worse by assisting in your time of need?  
Although this story is fictitious, it illustrates the situation many individuals find 
themselves in immediately after a hurricane. The ability of emergency response 
organizations to deploy enough resources in response to a disaster is being outpaced by the 
ever-increasing numbers of individuals in peril. Examples can been seen in the 2017 
hurricane season when three major storms made landfall in the United States (Harvey, 
Irma, and Maria) all within a short timeframe of one another, and in 2018, when Hurricanes 
Florence and Michael caused catastrophic damage along the eastern and gulf coasts of the 
United States. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), “Hurricane Michael, at a Category 4 intensity, was the strongest hurricane on 
record to strike the Florida panhandle,” and Hurricane Florence caused “catastrophic 
2 
flooding in portions of North and South Carolina” that shattered previous flooding 
records.1  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Spontaneous volunteers conducting search and rescue (SAR) in the aftermath of 
major hurricanes—such as Katrina in 2005, Harvey and Irma in 2017, and Florence and 
Michael in 2018—is changing the emergency management landscape. SAR organizations, 
such as the United States Coast Guard (USCG), need to understand how their own 
organizational response to disasters affects spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions. 
Failing to understand how an organization’s response to disasters affects the engagement 
and actions of spontaneous volunteers can challenge the established disaster response 
system.  
In the aftermath of a disaster, spontaneous volunteers are self-organizing and 
conducting independent SAR operations due to perceived or actual gaps in traditional SAR 
functions. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of citizens formed 
an ad hoc group later dubbed the “Cajun Navy,” which conducted SAR operations 
throughout the flooded streets of New Orleans, and were credited with rescuing nearly 
10,000 survivors.2 While the Cajun Navy is probably the most widely known occurrence 
of spontaneous volunteerism in recent memory, groups of spontaneous volunteers 
emerging during disasters has been well documented throughout history, and will 
undoubtedly be present in future disasters.  
 
1 “Destructive 2018 Atlantic Hurricane Season Draws to an End: NOAA Services before, during, after 
Storms Saved Lives and Aided Recovery,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, News & 
Features, November 28, 2018, https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/destructive-2018-atlantic-hurricane-
season-draws-to-end. 
2 Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 381; Eric Bonabeau and W. David Stephenson, “Expecting the 
Unexpected: The Need for a Networked Terrorism and Disaster Response Strategy,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 3, no. 1 (February 2007): 3, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/151; Nancy Casper, “Organizational 
Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior during Disaster Response and Recovery Operations” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 2, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5504; “How Citizens Turned into 
Saviors after Katrina Struck,” CBS News, August 29, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remembering-
the-cajun-navy-10-years-after-hurricane-katrina/; Kristopher Thornburg, “Disruptive Emergent Systems in 
Disaster Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), 32, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
62309. 
3 
Communities self-organizing in times of crises are not a new phenomenon. In fact, 
history is filled with examples of spontaneous volunteers responding in the face of 
adversity. Clara Burton noticed that injured soldiers on the battlefield were not being 
treated adequately during the Civil War, and organized a group of volunteers to hand out 
food, water, and bandages. Her efforts laid the foundation of the American Red Cross.3 
During World War II, Phillip Johnson, a civil engineer, leveraged his ability to speak 
Navajo to convince the U.S. Marine Corps to develop a Navajo code talker pilot program, 
which was credited with winning the battle of Iwo Jima.4 More recently, during the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, passengers on Flight 93 self-organized to stop hijackers 
from reaching their intended target in Washington, DC, and in addition to the Cajun Navy, 
Michael Knight, co-founder of the Acadian Ambulance service, used his 200 ambulances 
and helicopters to evacuate over 7,000 people during Hurricane Katrina.5  
According to disaster researchers, appropriately leveraging the creativity and 
ingenuity of motivated volunteers during a disaster can be very effective.6 However, others 
note that self-organizing groups during disasters are often viewed as a hindrance to official 
response functions, because they are believed to be disorganized, dysfunctional, inefficient, 
and oppose public authorities.7 
Spontaneous volunteers who emerge after disasters carry out many tasks that aid 
response and recovery operations. However, groups that organize and conduct SAR during 
 
3 “Clara Barton: Founder of the American Red Cross,” American Red Cross, 2010, 
https://www.redcross.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/clara-barton.html; Casper, “Organizational 
Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 5. 
4 William R. Wilson, “Codemakers: History of the Navajo Code Talkers,” HistoryNet, February 1997, 
https://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-navajo-code-talkers.htm; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s 
Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 5. 
5 Bonabeau and Stephenson, “Expecting the Unexpected,” 3; Casper, 5. 
6 James M. Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Elements of Resilience after the World Trade Center 
Disaster: Reconstituting New York City’s Emergency Operations Centre,” Disasters 27, no. 1 (2003): 37–
53, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00218; Casper, 9. 
7 Robert A. Stallings and E. L. Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” 
Public Administration Review 45, no. Special Issue (January 1985): 93–100, https://doi.org/10.2307/
3135003; Jack D. Kartez and William J. Kelley, “Research-Based Disaster Planning: Conditions for 
Implementation,” in Managing Disasters: Strategies and Policy Perspectives, ed. Louis Comfort (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 126–46. 
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hurricanes, such as the Cajun Navy, pose challenges for established SAR organizations. 
The USCG and other established SAR organizations should embrace these challenges, 
learn from past events, and prepare for the ever-increasing influx of spontaneous volunteers 
during future hurricane response operations. Additionally, a surge in spontaneous 
volunteerism is not exclusive to hurricanes. Emergency management officials and 
emergency responders should be prepared for an influx of spontaneous volunteers during 
any disaster, and should also seek to understand how their own organizational response 
affects spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the organizational response of the USCG 
during disasters that required maritime SAR, and to examine how the USCG’s 
organizational response affected spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions. By 
examining the USCG’s organizational response during disasters, and inquiring how it 
affects engagement with spontaneous volunteers who conduct SAR activities, this thesis 
seeks to determine what factors affect spontaneous volunteer engagement hopefully to 
incorporate spontaneous volunteer groups better into future hurricane responses. 
This research project was designed with the goal of answering the overall research 
question: How can the United States Coast Guard better engage organized spontaneous 
volunteers who conduct maritime search and rescue during hurricane response 
operations?  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN SUMMARY 
To answer this research question, an exploratory case study methodology was used 
to analyze the organizational response of both the USCG and organized spontaneous 
volunteers (OSVs) who conducted maritime SAR operations during three separate 
disasters. The organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs was analyzed 
according to the Disaster Research Center’s (DRC’s) four-fold typology of organized 
responses to disasters, in hopes of identifying specific factors of the USCG’s organizational 
response that affected OSV engagement. The intent of this analysis was to inquire if certain 
USCG organizational responses were more conducive than others were for engaging 
5 
OSVs. The cases studied were Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Harvey in 2017, and 
the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11. 
The research design is described in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Spontaneous volunteerism is not going away, and if recent history is any indication, 
spontaneous volunteers are not necessarily a hindrance, but should be viewed as an asset 
to be leveraged during disasters. Disaster response officials should plan on an influx of 
spontaneous volunteers during response operations, and should acknowledge that they can 
provide tremendous value to an already strained disaster response system.  
The key to leveraging the benefits of spontaneous volunteers during disasters is 
understanding how the organizational response of official organizations affects 
spontaneous volunteer engagement and actions. The goal should be to foster an 
environment in which spontaneous volunteer and official response efforts are collaborative 
or complementary to one another, rather than in conflict with each other.  
Effectively engaging spontaneous volunteers during disasters can be useful for 
large response organizations like the USCG, but can also be vital for smaller state, local, 
or tribal organizations often understaffed, underfunded, and expected to manage complex 
and dynamic events without outside assistance for at least the first few days following a 
disaster. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I highlighted that spontaneous volunteerism is not new. The occurrence of 
spontaneous volunteers however during recent disaster response operations is increasing, 
and more specifically, spontaneous volunteers who respond to conduct SAR in the 
aftermath of a hurricane. These spontaneous volunteers pose challenges for the established 
disaster response system, and established SAR organizations like the USCG need to 
understand how their own organizational response to disasters affects the engagement and 
actions of spontaneous volunteers.  
6 
Chapter II provides a foundational understanding of an organized response to 
disasters and spontaneous volunteerism, and is divided into two sections. The first section 
discusses collective group efforts, or organization, during disasters based on research 
conducted by the DRC, and introduces the DRC typology of organized responses to 
disasters. The second section defines spontaneous volunteerism, discusses potential 
spontaneous volunteer motivations, highlights the challenges and benefits that spontaneous 
volunteers pose to disaster response operations, and concludes with a brief discussion of 
spontaneous volunteers in a digital age. 
Chapter III provides background information on the USCG’s organizational 
response to SAR, as well as an overview of the USCG’s SAR mission, which highlights 
the tasks and structures used to perform SAR missions in alignment with the DRC 
typologies noted in Chapter II. Chapter III concludes by discussing the USCG’s role in 
maritime disaster response operations, specifically disaster responses that have a maritime 
SAR component. 
Chapter IV contains the research design used for this thesis and details how an 
exploratory case study methodology was used to analyze the organizational response of 
both the USCG and OSVs who conducted maritime SAR operations during three separate 
disasters. The intent of this research and analysis was to inquire if certain USCG 
organizational responses were more conducive than others were for engaging OSVs. 
Chapter V includes three case studies in which both the USCG and OSVs conducted 
maritime SAR as part of the overall disaster response. Each case study provides a brief 
background of the case, an analysis of the SAR response by both the USCG and OSVs, 
and concludes with an overall assessment of factors that contributed or hindered the 
response efforts of each organization. 
Chapter VI provides an analysis of the organizational response of both the USCG 
and OSVs, according to the DRC’s four-fold typology of organized responses to disasters, 
to identify specific factors of the USCG’s organizational response that affected OSV 
engagement. This chapter concludes with a cross-case analysis used to note overall trends 
and patterns between each case study to generalize commonalities and draw conclusions. 
7 
Chapter VII revisits the research question and offers recommendations on ways that 
the USCG can better engage organized spontaneous volunteers who conduct maritime SAR 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
9 
II. ORGANIZED RESPONSE TO DISASTERS AND 
SPONTANEOUS VOLUNTEERS 
This chapter is divided into two sections that provide a foundational understanding 
of an organized response to disasters and spontaneous volunteerism. The first section 
discusses collective group efforts, or organization, during disasters based on research 
conducted by the DRC, and introduces the DRC typology of organized responses to 
disasters. The second section defines spontaneous volunteerism, discusses potential 
spontaneous volunteer motivations, highlights the challenges and benefits that spontaneous 
volunteers pose to disaster response operations, and concludes with a brief discussion of 
spontaneous volunteers in a digital age. 
A. ORGANIZED RESPONSE TO DISASTER: A SOCIOLOGIST 
PERSPECTIVE FROM DISASTER RESEARCH 
I do believe that the problem of responses to at least large-scale disasters do 
particularity lend themselves to sociological analysis.8  
—Dr. Enrico Quarantelli 
After decades of disaster research, one thing is certain. Organizational, or collective 
group efforts, will always be present during disasters. However, the real phenomenon is 
that this collective group effort is not exclusive to pre-established or official organizations. 
Disaster research is a relatively new field of study. It was not until 1963 that disaster 
studies were institutionalized by the creation of the DRC at the Ohio State University (later 
moved to the University of Delaware).9 Tied to the sociologist department, the DRC was 
adequately funded and staffed to maintain field-ready research teams that would 
immediately respond after a disaster and begin conducting research. The goal of this 
research was to study organizational functioning under stress. The DRC research teams 
 
8 Enrico L. Quarantelli, “Organization under Stress,” in Symposium on Emergency Operations, ed. 
Robert Brictson (Santa Monica, CA: System Development Corporation, 1966), 3, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/
tr/fulltext/u2/640543.pdf. 
9 E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, “Response to Social Crisis and Disaster,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 3 (1977): 27, www.jstor.org/stable/2945929. 
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quickly discovered that organization was always present in disaster situations; however; 
this organization was not exclusive to pre-established organizations or formalized 
groups.10 Based on the DRC’s in depth and longitudinal studies of both domestic and 
international disasters, a fourfold typology of organized responses to community-wide 
disasters was developed.11 
The DRC typology essentially states that an organized response during disasters 
either involves regular or non-regular tasks, and the structures used to carry out these tasks 
either existed before the disaster or were developed during the disaster. If these dimensions 
of task and structure are cross-tabulated, four types of groups (established, extending, 
expanding, and emergent) are identified as depicted in Table 1.  
Table 1. DRC Typology of Organized Responses to Disasters.12 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
 
Examples of established groups would be a local fire department conducting fire 
suppression, or a local police department conducting traffic control after a severe 
thunderstorm or tornado strikes a community. These groups use their existing structures to 
carry out traditional or regular tasks during the disaster response, and these tasks and 
structures are the same for routine or daily operations. The American Red Cross setting up 
emergency shelters after a disaster is an example of an expanding group. The Red Cross 
 
10 E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, Different Types of Organizations in Disaster Responses and 
Their Operational Problems, Preliminary Papers, No. 41 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware, Disaster 
Research Center, 1977), 1, http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/414.  
11 Quarantelli, “Organization under Stress,” 4. 
12 Adapted from Quarantelli and Dynes, Different Types of Organizations in Disaster Responses, 2; 
Havidán Rodríguez, Joseph Trainor, and Enrico L. Quarantelli, “Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: 
The Emergent and Prosocial Behavior Following Hurricane Katrina,” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 604, no. 1 (2006): 85, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716205284677. 
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establishes these shelters using new structures, due to a surge in volunteer staffing. 
However, the task of setting up shelters is a regular, albeit latent task for the group. A 
demolition company using its personnel and equipment to sort through and remove debris 
caused by an earthquake or explosion is an example of an extending group. Demolition 
companies clearing and removing debris from a disaster site is a non-regular task, 
especially if evidence needs to be preserved. However, existing group structures would 
carry out the performance of these tasks. Lastly, an emergent group is any ad hoc group 
formed to carry out a specific set of tasks in which the group defines the tasks and the 
structure to be used to carry them out. For example, a city engineer, meteorologist, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and community volunteers may all come together to identify at 
risk sections of a community and construct temporary sandbag dikes in response to a flood.  
B. SPONTANEOUS VOLUNTEERISM DURING DISASTERS 
This section focuses on defining key terms often used synonymously throughout 
spontaneous volunteerism literature, such as convergence and emergence, and explores 
potential motivations behind spontaneous volunteer actions during disasters. Additionally, 
this section highlights both the challenges and benefits associated with spontaneous 
volunteers during disasters and concludes by discussing the increasing role technology can 
have in spontaneous volunteer behavior. 
1. What Is a Spontaneous Volunteer?  
Literature recognizes that spontaneous volunteers are an inevitable part of disasters 
because, “ordinary citizens are usually first on the scene in an emergency or disaster and 
remain long after official services have ceased.”13 However, disaster management, in most 
developed countries, relies on professional responders, and only to a small degree leverages 
volunteers affiliated with official organizations.14 This reliance can be explained because 
 
13 Joshua Whittaker, Blythe McLennan, and John Handmer, “A Review of Informal Volunteerism in 
Emergencies and Disasters: Definition, Opportunities and Challenges,” International Journal of Disaster 
Risk Reduction 13 (September 2015): 359, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.07.010. 
14 David Alexander, “The Voluntary Sector in Emergency Response and Civil Protection: Review and 
Recommendations,” International Journal of Emergency Management 7, no. 2 (2010): 151–66, 
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEM.2010.033654, quoted in Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, 359. 
12 
official responders may tend to view themselves as the ones who have the knowledge, 
training, skills, and authority to manage and mitigate a disaster effectively. However, 
following this faulty logic leads to an assumption that if individuals are not part of an 
official organization then they are by default victims who must need rescuing. This 
perspective supports a long-standing myth that average citizens will panic during disasters 
and will not be able to help themselves or others.  
However, during disasters, average citizens do not panic, but rather act in rational 
ways, and according to Helsloot and Ruitenberg, are considered, “the most effective kind 
of emergency personnel,” usually credited with saving the most lives.15 For example, in 
1995, after an earthquake struck Kobe, Japan, official responders “only found about a 
quarter” of the trapped individuals, while average citizens performed the majority of the 
rescues.16 Additionally, in 2015, when an earthquake struck Kathmandu, Nepal, “local 
residents were the first responders” saving trapped individuals from collapsed structures, 
and provided food, shelter, and supplies for survivors.17 Lastly, during the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, the majority of life-saving and relief efforts in Sri Lanka and Thailand 
came from communities in the Maldives, which “sent boats to rescue people from islands 
that were no longer habitual,” and worked to shelter rescued individuals with host 
families.18 
 
15 I. Helsloot and A. Ruitenberg, “Citizen Response to Disasters: A Survey of Literature and Some 
Practical Implications,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 12, no. 3 (September 2004): 98, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0966-0879.2004.00440.x. 
16 Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 103. 
17 John Twigg and Irina Mosel, “Emergent Groups and Spontaneous Volunteers in Urban Disaster 
Response,” Environment and Urbanization 29, no. 2 (October 2017): 444, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0956247817721413. 
18 Twigg and Mosel, 444. 
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a. Convergence 
Much of the early literature regarding spontaneous volunteers during disasters starts 
with the analysis provided by Fritz and Mathewson on convergence.19 Convergence is “the 
mass movement of people, messages, and supplies toward the disaster-struck area,” and 
encompasses two processes, “the notion of movement toward the disaster-struck area from 
the outside—external convergence—and movement toward specific points within a given 
disaster-related area or zone—internal convergence.”20 Fritz and Mathewson classified 
converging individuals into five separate groups: “(1) the returners, (2) the anxious, (3) the 
helpers, (4) the curious, and (5) the exploiters” in an attempt to examine different 
motivations that led to convergent behavior.21 Kendra and Wachtendorf built upon the 
Fritz and Mathewson study and identified a new group within the convergence 
classification, “fans or supporters” who show up at disasters to encourage and support the 
emergency responders.22 
Additionally, Fritz and Mathewson, Lowe and Fothergill, and Tierney and Perry 
note that the “helpers” or volunteers who converge on the disaster area typically perform 
the majority of the SAR and response tasks required immediately following a disaster.23 
This neighbor-helping-neighbor construct is almost instantaneous after a disaster and 
begins before local authorities can arrive and set up formal organizational structures. 
 
19 Charles E. Fritz and John H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social 
Control (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1957), 
http://archive.org/details/convergencebehav00fritrich; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on 
Emergent Behavior,” 9–10; Seana Lowe and Alice Fothergill, “A Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer 
Behavior after September 11th,” in Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research, ed. 
Jacquelyn Monday (Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, Natural Hazards Research and 
Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, 2003), 293–314, http://hdl.handle.net/10176/
co:5395; James M. Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, Rebel Food... Renegade Supplies: Convergence after 
the World Trade Center Attack, Preliminary Papers, No. 316 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 
Disaster Research Center, 2001), http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/708; Kathleen J. Tierney and 
Ronald W. Perry, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States 
(Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2001), ProQuest Ebook Central. 
20 Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters, 1–3; Casper, “Organizational 
Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 9–10. 
21 Fritz and Mathewson, 29. 
22 Kendra and Wachtendorf, Rebel Food, 6–7. 
23 Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters, 40–41; Lowe and Fothergill, “A Need to 
Help,” 294; Tierney and Perry, Facing the Unexpected, 110. 
14 
However, even when formal organizational structures are established, Fritz and 
Mathewson noted that disaster survivors often prefer private or informal solutions to meet 
their needs over formal public solutions, even if public assistance is more adequate.24 This 
preference includes choosing to shelter with friends or family in lieu of public shelters or 
government provided housing, because familiarity and intimacy are tangible factors.25  
The convergence of “helpers” to disaster sites follows along the same familiarity 
and intimacy lines.26 Internal convergence begins when survivors start seeking out their 
family and loved ones; however, once their initial concerns are satisfied, it extends to 
neighbors, friends, and other community-oriented issues.27 External convergence is also 
influenced by familiarity, and the speed and volume of external convergence is directly 
correlated to the personal connections with those in the disaster area, and a proximity to 
the disaster site.28 Individuals not located near a disaster site often learn of the disaster 
through media outlets, and rather than converge on the site itself, they tend to send money, 
goods, and supplies into the disaster-stricken area. However, familiarity and intimacy still 
play an important role as, “evidence suggests that personal identification or involvement 
with an individual or organization within the impacted area is more likely to result in 
donations,” which reinforces that familiarity and intimacy are important factors in 
convergent behavior.29  
b. Emergence 
In contrast to Fritz and Mathewson’s convergence, emergence is not associated 
with a single individual or small group of individuals working independently, but consists 
of a collective of individuals who form a cohesive group in response to the same problem 
 
24 Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters, 40–41. 
25 Fritz and Mathewson, 40–41; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 
10. 
26 Fritz and Mathewson, 42. 
27 Fritz and Mathewson, 42. 
28 Fritz and Mathewson, 42–43. 
29 Fritz and Mathewson, 43–44. 
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or perceived need.30 Stallings and Quarantelli define emergence as, “private citizens who 
work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential disasters but 
whose organization has not yet become institutionalized.”31 The emergence of a group is 
considered controversial during disasters, because it seems to imply that an official 
organization does not exist, or is not able to respond to the problem.32 
Stallings and Quarantelli observed several characteristics of emergent groups, and 
noted that they lack traditional structures, such as a chain of command and defined 
divisions of labor.33 These groups tend to “have a flat hierarchy with little distance between 
the top and bottom,” which can make these groups appear unorganized and inefficient.34 
However, when compared to official organizations, emergent groups have far less 
resources devoted to administrative or management functions, and have the ability to shift 
their focus quickly, take on new tasks, and develop new procedures or rules. Additionally, 
emergent groups often have access to a greater depth of resources (donated items or 
volunteered time).35 Stallings and Quarantelli note that while emergent groups may appear 
unorganized and dysfunctional, inherent flexibility is precisely what makes them so 
effective at coping with dynamic disasters.36 Furthermore, they claim the appearance of 
emergent groups should not be considered a failure by established organizations, as much 
as it should highlight that an alternative is always available to deal with a particular 
problem.37 
It is important to note that emergent groups can develop during any stage of the 
disaster cycle (preparedness, response, or recovery). However, convergent groups only 
 
30 Stallings and Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” 94. 
31 Stallings and Quarantelli, 3; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 
10. 
32 Stallings and Quarantelli, 94. 
33 Stallings and Quarantelli, 98. 
34 Stallings and Quarantelli, 95. 
35 Stallings and Quarantelli, 95–98. 
36 Stallings and Quarantelli, 98. 
37 Stallings and Quarantelli, 98. 
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appear in the response and recovery phase of the disaster cycle, as they are in direct 
response to the event itself.38 According to researchers Kendra and Wachtendorf, both 
convergence and emergence can appear during disasters and should be considered 
complimentary to one another:  
Converging volunteers often gravitate to groups that have emerged in 
response to disasters, either to provide additional support or to perform tasks 
that complement those of emergent groups. At the same time, by providing 
ever-larger numbers of volunteers, convergence sets the stage for further 
emergence.39 
Lastly, emergent groups are not well understood. Therefore, they are often not 
considered when planning for emergencies. However, if history has demonstrated 
anything, it is that emergence is likely to be ever more present in future disasters.40 
Stallings and Quarantelli note that the impetus of sustained involvement by emergent 
groups can be directly correlated to the recognition of the group by others, as well as 
groups’ beliefs that emergency management officials will support their efforts once 
attention has been drawn to their issues.41 According to their research, emergent groups 
hold a positive or neutral view of emergency management officials, but may become 
hostile if they feel that officials do not recognize the benefits they provide.42 However, an 
adversarial relationship may also form from the beginning if emergency management 
officials believe that emergent groups are in direct opposition to their organized 
structure.43 
 
38 Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 10–11. 
39 Kendra and Wachtendorf, Rebel Food, 8; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on 
Emergent Behavior,” 11. 
40 Stallings and Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management,” 94. 
41 Stallings and Quarantelli, 95–98; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent 
Behavior,” 11. 
42 Stallings and Quarantelli, 98. 
43 Stallings and Quarantelli, 98; Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” 
11. 
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2. Spontaneous Volunteer Motivations  
Research into human nature during disasters has shown, “groups and individuals 
typically become more unified, cohesive, and altruistic in such events,” and according to 
Kathleen Tierney, individuals tend to put their own self-interests aside and volunteer to 
help others during disasters.44 However, research is limited concerning motivations behind 
spontaneous volunteerism. Researchers Lowe and Fothergill, and Twigg and Mosel, 
suggest that a compelling need to “do something” is very strong during a disaster.45 Twigg 
and Mosel also suggest that this overwhelming feeling of social obligation, sense of 
community, and shared values may contribute to a volunteer’s motivation during disasters; 
stating, “people may feel personally affected by disasters that affect their neighborhoods 
or localities, even if they themselves, or their personal property, are not directly 
affected.”46  
While motivations tend to vary according to each event and its associated social, 
political, and cultural context, and a typical profile for disasters response volunteers does 
not exist, some commonalities do appear to exist. Awareness of risks and previous disaster 
experience tend to indicate a higher involvement in disaster volunteerism.47 Additionally, 
volunteerism during disasters can be broken down into two categories, internal factors and 
external factors. According to Lowe and Fothergill’s research into volunteer behavior after 
9/11, volunteers provide external benefits, but receive internal benefits from 
volunteering.48 External benefits are provided to those they are assisting, whereas internal 
benefits are found in the fact that volunteers find something meaningful in the face of 
tragedy. They summarize their work best by stating, “we believe, the most noteworthy 
impact of … volunteer work [is] how the experience positively affected the volunteers 
 
44 Tierney and Perry, Facing the Unexpected, 295; Twigg and Mosel, “Emergent Groups and 
Spontaneous Volunteers in Urban Disaster Response,” 444. 
45 Lowe and Fothergill, “A Need to Help,” 298; Twigg and Mosel, 449. 
46 Twigg and Mosel, 449. 
47 Twigg and Mosel, 449. 
48 Lowe and Fothergill, “A Need to Help.” 
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themselves.”49 Regardless of the motivations or benefits of volunteerism, it is important 
to note that spontaneous volunteerism is more likely to occur when a perception that 
official response functions cannot address all the problems created by the disaster, or their 
capacity to respond adequately is insufficient.50  
3. Challenges with Spontaneous Volunteerism  
While volunteer motivations can vary, one fact remains clear. Spontaneous 
volunteers are going to respond to disasters. This fact may create opportunities for response 
organizations because the use of volunteers can be a positive and useful component of the 
disaster response.51 However, disasters also cause an influx of people and goods into the 
disaster area, at the same time, and if coordination does not occur, chaos can ensue.52 
According to some researchers, if spontaneous volunteers are going to be used during 
disaster response, they need to be incorporated using robust registration, credentialing, and 
training programs.53 Moreover, concerns continue to be raised regarding the risk of using 
“untrained and inexperienced volunteers” during complex disaster response and recovery 
operations, despite the benefits they may provide.54 Some academics and experienced 
responders even note that spontaneous volunteers have no role to play in disaster 
response.55 
Fernandez, Barbera, and Van Drop state that the mass convergence of spontaneous 
volunteers can create “health, safety, and security issues” during disaster responses, and 
 
49 Lowe and Fothergill, 303. 
50 Twigg and Mosel, “Emergent Groups and Spontaneous Volunteers in Urban Disaster Response.” 
51 Helsloot and Ruitenberg, “Citizen Response to Disasters,” 103; Lauren M. Sauer et al., “The Utility 
of and Risks Associated with the Use of Spontaneous Volunteers in Disaster Response: A Survey,” 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 8, no. 1 (February 2014): 67, https://doi.org/10.1017/
dmp.2014.12.  
52 Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 103. 
53 Lauren S. Fernandez, Joseph A. Barbera, and Johan R. Van Drop, “Strategies for Managing 
Volunteers during Incident Response: A Systems Approach,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 
2006): 1–15, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25078; Sauer et al., “The Utility of and Risks Associated,” 67. 
54 Sauer et al., 67. 
55 Sauer et al., 67. 
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may actually hinder the response by distracting responders.56 They go on to note that 
because response organizations have not prepared for the massive influx of spontaneous 
volunteers, they do not have an effective management system in place to incorporate them, 
which results in an ad hoc approach that pulls responders away from their primary 
functions to supervise volunteer actions and manage their logistics.57 According to 
Fernandez, volunteer responders are an important and flexible resource during disasters, 
but volunteer resources can also create command and control challenges if a system to 
manage them is not in place.58 Fernandez suggests that through effective planning, 
volunteer resources can be capitalized upon by incorporating them into existing incident 
command and control systems through a volunteer management system.59  
While much of the disaster planning literature notes that preparing for disasters 
requires a top-down “command and control” model for disaster response, it makes the 
faulty assumption that disasters can only be handled using a centralized decision-making 
process.60 Disaster research over the past few decades has noted that a top-down command 
and control process is rarely used during an actual disaster and response organizations tend 
to use a more coordination vice control model, because decisions need to be made rapidly 
and by decentralized lower levels of organizations.61  
In contrast to a formalized command and control system to coordinate spontaneous 
volunteers during disasters, Nancy Casper posits that:  
As emergency management continues to become more complex, 
organizational leadership will be challenged to balance the need for 
standard operating procedures and policies against the ability to leverage 
 
56 Fernandez, Barbera, and Van Drop, “Strategies for Managing Volunteers during Incident 
Response,” 1–2. 
57 Fernandez, Barbera, and Van Drop, 2. 
58 Lauren S. Fernandez, “Volunteer Management System Design and Analysis for Disaster Response 
and Recovery” (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2007), https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/
304875080.html?FMT=ABS. 
59 Fernandez. 
60 Dynes, Quarantelli, and Wenger, Individual and Organizational Response to the 1985 Earthquake 
in Mexico City, Mexico, 115. 
61 Dynes, Quarantelli, and Wenger, 115. 
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emergent behavior that allows for innovation in addressing the specific 
problems brought on by each unique disaster.62 
4. Benefits of Spontaneous Volunteerism 
Spontaneous volunteers can provide a variety of benefits to the overall disaster 
response system, individual emergency response organizations, and the community they 
support during disasters. According to Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, spontaneous 
volunteers emerge immediately after a disaster, before emergency personnel are able to 
mobilize, and are the true “first responders” performing tasks, such as SAR, first aid, 
damage assessment, and assessing community needs.63 Additionally, these researchers 
note that average citizens can play a vital role in helping official agencies during disasters, 
and argue that due to increasing disasters risks worldwide, urban growth and development, 
and climate change, spontaneous volunteers will be necessary to provide the required surge 
capacity needed to handle future disasters.64  
However, the ability and success of spontaneous volunteers to provide relief during 
disasters relies heavily on the “capacity of agencies and authorities to integrate them 
quickly and effectively into a coordinated strategy.”65 As noted previously, a large influx 
of spontaneous volunteers can pose challenges for response organizations; however, 
according to McLennan, Whitaker, and Handmer, these challenges are due to the model of 
traditional volunteer management.66 Traditional volunteer management is grounded on 
assumptions that volunteers are going to make a commitment to a particular organization 
 
62 Casper, “Organizational Leadership’s Impact on Emergent Behavior,” v. 
63 Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, “A Review of Informal Volunteerism in Emergencies and 
Disasters,” 360. 
64 Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, 359. 
65 International Federation of Red Cross, World Disasters Report. 2001, ed. Jonathan Walter (Geneva: 
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and is based on a long-term commitment for community service.67 Spontaneous volunteers 
respond to disasters in more non-traditional ways, are often less formally connected, and 
volunteer for shorter durations; however, they can be diverse and autonomous and embrace 
new technologies.68 An example can be seen when Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 
crashed into the Indian Ocean on March 8, 2014 and 2.3 million spontaneous volunteers 
joined in on the search for the missing airliner by scanning more than 24,000 square 
kilometers of satellite imagery uploaded to the website Tomnod.69 
5. Spontaneous Volunteers in the Digital Age 
Bonabeau and Stephenson argue that the conventional management approach (a 
hierarchical structure) for natural disaster response is fundamentally mismatched to the 
actual tasks required.70 Instead, they argue that flexible and highly adaptive networks are 
needed for disaster response. Additionally, the authors argue that rather than emphasizing 
the command and control aspects of disaster response, the focus should be on creating new 
and alternative emergency management approaches that focus on new communication 
technologies and tap into the science of social networks.71 Thus, the authors advocate that 
networked communication devices made available for the general public will foster a 
greater “collective intelligence” during disaster response.72 
Increased public support through social media platforms is accelerating the 
changing emergency management landscape. Hughes and Tapia stated, “Members of the 
public can now participate more broadly in times of crisis as they collect, create, share, and 
 
67 McLennan et al., 24; Lesley Hustinx and Frans Lammertyn, “Collective and Reflexive Styles of 
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seek online information through social media.”73 This influx of information allows the 
average citizen to become more aware of disasters, as well as the needs of those affected 
by the disaster, which leads to an increased desire to coordinate and help.74 Starbird and 
Palen have also noted that a growing informal response community of “digital volunteers” 
has emerged, and they are able to evolve quickly to fill emergency needs using social media 
tools.75 While research still needs to be conducted on the effects of social media and 
volunteerism, one thing is clear. Spontaneous volunteers are using digital tools to self-
organize and respond during disasters.  
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a foundational understanding of organized responses to 
disasters and spontaneous volunteerism, and noted that an organized response or collective 
group effort is always occurring during disasters. However, this organized response is not 
limited to pre-established or official organizations. According to the DRC, a four-fold 
typology exists that can be used to identify and classify an organization based on the tasks 
undertaken and the organizational structures used to carry out those tasks during a disaster 
response. This chapter also noted that spontaneous volunteers are an inevitable part of 
disasters. However, they are often not leveraged by official response organizations because 
spontaneous volunteerism is not well understood, despite the value it may provide.  
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While spontaneous volunteer motivations can vary, and the process by which 
spontaneous volunteers either converge or emerge during disasters is often difficult to 
recognize and prepare for (especially as spontaneous volunteers embrace social media and 
other digital technologies), official response organizations continue to disregard 
spontaneous volunteer groups, or substantial effort is expended attempting to incorporate 
them into existing command and control systems. Yet, recent disaster research studies have 
highlighted that during actual disasters, a rigid top-down command and control process is 
routinely being substituted for a more coordination vice control model of response. If 
official response organizations want to increase coordination efforts with spontaneous 
volunteers during future disaster response operations, then they need to have a better 
understanding of how their own organizational response to disasters may affect the 
coordination efforts and actions of spontaneous volunteers.  
The next chapter discusses the USCG’s maritime SAR mission and its 
organizational response to disasters that require a maritime SAR component.  
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III. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD’S SEARCH AND RESCUE 
MISSION AND DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
This chapter provides background information on the USCG’s organizational 
response to SAR during steady state and large-scale disaster operations, and is divided into 
two sections. The first section provides an overview of the USCG’s SAR mission and 
highlights the tasks and structures used to perform the SAR mission. The second section 
discusses the USCG’s role in maritime disaster response, specifically disaster responses 
that require maritime SAR. 
A. USCG SAR MISSION 
The USCG is a multi-mission service with mandates to perform 11 statutory 
missions. These missions include SAR, maritime drug and migrant interdiction, ports, 
waterways and coastal security, enforcement of laws and treaties, living marine resources 
protection, marine environmental protection, aids to navigation, ice operations, marine 
safety, and defense readiness.76 
The USCG’s SAR mission “is a demand-driven mission” conducted “in support of 
international and domestic obligations,” with the overall goal of leveraging USCG assets 
and resources to prevent the loss of life whenever possible.77 “The USCG … also assists 
[other] federal agencies, [and] state, local, and tribal partners with terrestrial-based SAR,” 
and “respond [s] to mass rescue operation (MRO) events, such as Hurricane Katrina;” 
where the USCG SAR response was credited with saving over 35,000 people.78 
 
76 Chuck Young, Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions 
Related to Hurricane Katrina, GAO-06-903 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2006), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-903; Meredith L. Austin, “Engage the Media Coast Guard’s Public 
Affairs Posture during the Response to Hurricane Katrina” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2007), 15, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3658. 
77 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), U.S. Coast Guard Search and 
Rescue Mission Analysis Report (Washington, DC: Office of Performance Management and Assessment 
(DCO-81), 2017), 16–21. Author’s experience: I have served at multiple positions in the USCG SAR chain 
of command to include deploying as a search and rescue unit (SRU), planning SAR responses at the sector 
command center level, and being responsible for coordinating specific SAR operations as a SAR mission 
coordinator (SMC). 
78 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 15; Young, Coast Guard. 
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1. SAR Structure and Organization 
The USCG is structured in a way that aligns its SAR mission according to 
“internationally recognized SAR system standards,” within specific SAR regions (SRRs) 
that cover inland, coastal, and offshore waters.79 
An SRR is an area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) or International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), within which SAR services are provided.80 
Each SRR contains a USCG district office that serves as a rescue coordination 
center (RCC), responsible for assisting and overseeing all USCG missions within the 
SRR.81 USCG districts oversee operations within “established geographical areas of 
responsibly,” however, to reduce command and control issues “one or more Sectors … 
conduct various USCG mission [s]” in support of each district or RCC.82 A total of 37 
sectors “maintain command and control” over USCG maritime and aviation assets, and are 
depicted in Figure 1. All available USCG SAR units (SRUs), or assets used for SAR 
response, fall within the operational control of sectors, and perform both inland and costal 
SAR missions.83 
 
79 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 16–17. 
80 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 17. 
81 National Search and Rescue Committee, National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States 
(Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2016), https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/manuals/
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82 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 17–20. 
83 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 20. Author’s experience: I have 
served at multiple positions in the USCG SAR chain of command to include deploying as an SRU, 
planning SAR responses at the Sector Command Center level, and being responsible for coordinating 
specific SAR operations as a SMC. 
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Figure 1. USCG Sectors.84 
2. SAR Tasks and Mission Execution 
The USCG SAR mission can be broken down into four tasks: “distress monitoring 
and communications, search planning and preparation, SAR coordination, and SAR 
operations.”85 
a. Distress Monitoring and Communications 
The first task in the SAR mission is notification of distress. The USCG can be 
alerted of a distress situation through a variety of methods that include very high frequency-
 
84 Source: United States Coast Guard, “2017 United States Coast Guard Sectors Map,” Homeport, 
2017, https://homeport.uscg.mil/Pages/Sector-Map.aspx. 
85 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), U.S. Coast Guard Search and 
Rescue Mission Analysis Report, 22. Author’s experience: I have served at multiple positions in the USCG 
SAR chain of command to include deploying as an SRU, planning SAR responses at the Sector Command 
Center level, and being responsible for coordinating specific SAR operations as a SMC. 
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frequency modulated (VHF-FM) radio calls, landline and cellular telephone calls, digital 
selective calling (DSC), maritime distress flares, or electronic beacons received through 
the COSPAS-SARSAT system.86 After receiving a distress notification, the USCG’s first 
action is to issue an urgent marine information broadcast (UMIB) to alert nearby vessels 
of the distress situation, and to request their assistance locating the individuals in distress 
or rendering aid.87 
b. Search Planning and Preparations 
After a distress notification is received, the next SAR task is to conduct a risk 
assessment and planning process to determine if the USCG can safely and effectively 
undertake a particular SAR mission.88 This risk assessment and planning process considers 
potential risks to responding assets and personnel, as well as “the likelihood of a successful 
rescue” despite the known risks.89 SAR missions will be initiated if the potential for saving 
a life is high, and the USCG feels that its resources and personnel are able to conduct the 
mission. However, depending on the individual factors of each case, the USCG may decide 
to request assistance from other governmental agencies (OGAs), merchant vessels that 
participate in the Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system, or Good 
Samaritans.90 If the USCG accepts a mission, sector command center personnel will 
develop a search action plan based on the distressed individual’s situation, considering 
 
86 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23; “SARSAT is an acronym that 
stands for Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking. COMSPAS is an acronym for the Russian words 
‘Cosmicheskaya Sistyema Poiska Avariynich Sudov,’ which mean ‘Space System for the Search of Vessels 
in Distress,’” and the COSPAS-SARSAT system is an international satellite system for SAR distress 
alerting established by Canada, France, the United States, and the former USSR, “COSPAS-SARSAT 
Search and Rescue System,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, accessed April 27, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/pdf/
105930main_cospas.pdf; Digital Selective Calling is a “VHF and MF/HF radiotelephone service [for] 
mariners as part of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System. This service…, allows mariners to 
instantly send an automatically formatted distress alert to the Coast Guard or other rescue authority 
anywhere in the world,” United States Coast Guard, “Digital Selective Calling,” Navigation Center, 
September 2018, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AboutDSC.  
87 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
88 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
89 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
90 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
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external factors, such as last known position, sea conditions, and wind speed or direction. 
Once a suitable plan is developed, the USCG will deploy the most appropriate SRU for the 
mission, i.e., aircraft, oceangoing vessel, or small boat.91 However, it is important to note 
that even if the USCG determines that another response asset is more appropriate due to 
specialized capabilities or proximity to the distress situation, the USCG will still oversee 
and coordinate SAR response efforts, until the distress situation has been resolved and the 
individuals in distress have been rescued.  
c. SAR Coordination 
An efficient and effective SAR response often necessitates coordination with other 
response entities at both the international and domestic level.92 Examples of domestic 
coordination are arraigning emergency medical services to meet USCG boats dockside to 
quickly transfer injured individuals to a higher level of medical care, or requesting local 
law enforcement or fire department assistance to access and search very shallow backwater 
tributaries or bays.93 An example of international coordination may be airspace de-
confliction and approval from foreign governments to conduct SAR operations within their 
countries’ jurisdiction.94 This type of coordination is especially prevalent in SRRs adjacent 
to foreign countries, such as the Great Lakes or Caribbean.  
d. SAR Operations 
The final task in the SAR mission is to deploy “one or more Search and Rescue 
Units (SRUs).”95 The USCG conducts SAR operations using a “systems approach,” which 
employs various combinations of its own assets, OGA vessels, Good Samaritans, and 
 
91 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
92 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 23. 
93 Author’s experience: Local fire departments or law enforcement agencies often have flat bottom 
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shallow water vessels available for deployment during disaster response operations. 
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Rescue Mission Analysis Report, 23. 
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commercial towing providers.96 However, it is important to note that each approach has 
its “own advantages and disadvantages,” and that each USCG SAR response varies 
depending on a variety of factors, such as weather conditions, nature of distress, and the 
number of persons affected, as well as the geographic area where distressed individuals are 
located.97 For cases far from shore, USCG aircraft are the best resource, and while “fixed 
wing aircraft can arrive on scene much faster than a rotary wing aircraft,” they have no 
hoisting capability to rescue distressed individuals from the water.98 Fixed wing aircraft 
can however drop vital rescue equipment, such as lift rafts and dewatering pumps, and have 
much longer on scene endurance times. Additionally, while surface SRUs, such as ships 
and small boats can arrive on scene to “assist dewatering efforts, provide basic medical 
assistance, evacuate people from the vessel, and/or tow damaged vessels to shore,” they 
have a much slower response time.99 
Regardless of which USCG SRU will be deployed, prior to launching any SRUs, 
the cognizant sector command center will generate a search action plan. This plan will be 
used by the SRUs to search for distressed persons or craft if the location is unknown; 
however, once the distress location is known, a rescue plan will be developed “based on 
the specifics of the case.”100 This rescue plan must be communicated to the individuals in 
distress, as well as any other responders, and must continually be re-evaluated and modified 
based on ongoing operations.101 For example, a rescue plan may be developed for a vessel 
taking on water in which an SRU intends to arrive on scene and begin dewatering 
operations. However, once on scene, the rescue plan may change to an evacuation plan, if 
the flooding is too great, or worse yet, the vessel sinks before the arrival of any SRUs. 
Additionally, if the individuals onboard abandon the vessel, a revised search plan may be 
needed to locate them again. Lastly, if rescue operations remove individuals from a 
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distressed vessel, and the USCG is unable to tow the vessel back to shore, i.e., distressed 
persons were removed via a helicopter, the Coast Guard may work with commercial towing 
providers to tow the vessel back.102 
B. USCG’S SAR ROLE DURING MARITIME DISASTER RESPONSE
Similar to steady state operations, the USCG performs its SAR mission during 
disasters. The USCG uses its ships, aircraft, and small boats to respond to disasters that 
affect ports, inland and coastal waters, and adjacent land areas.103 The skills and equipment 
used to search for people in distress, rescue them from danger, and tow disabled vessels to 
safety are essentially the same regardless if they are conducted during steady state 
operations or in conjunction with disaster response operations. The primary difference is 
the scale and frequency of operations, which can overwhelm the response capacity of 
USCG assets.  
However, one new mission variant has evolved during recent disasters that the 
USCG does not conduct during daily operations and only performs during disaster events. 
The SAR of individuals from floodwaters in urban areas requires different knowledge, 
skills, training, and equipment. Other local, state, and federal agencies typically require 
specific training to perform surface water or swift water rescue operations. This training is 
covered under the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1006 Standard for 
Technical Rescuer Professional Qualifications, 2008 Edition.104 While the USCG does 
maintain a fleet of shallow water response boats for inland flooding response, personnel 
rely on previous experience, or improvisation to conduct these tasks vice formal training. 
1. National Response System and the USCG
Like other federal, state, and local response organizations, the USCG participates 
in disaster responses using the roles and structures defined by ICS, as part of the National 
102 Office of Performance Management and Assessment (DCO-81), 25. 
103 Deputy Commandant for Operations, Disaster Response Mission Analysis Report (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Coast Guard, 2018), 12. 
104 Deputy Commandant for Operations, 45. 
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Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF); 
however, the USCG has been responding to disasters long before NIMS or NRF mandates.  
Throughout history, the USCG has responded to meet the nation’s needs during 
disasters. However, the strategic landscape surrounding disasters has changed over time 
and altered the USCG’s response from a more decentralized local operation, to a more 
highly synchronized event that requires coordination with numerous other federal, state, 
and local agencies.105 The Appendix contains additional information regarding the 
background, evolution, and challenges of the U.S. disaster response system. Until the early 
2000s, local Coast Guard commanders, using the operational assets and personnel already 
assigned or locally available, mostly initiated and controlled the USCG’s response to 
disasters. This decentralized command and control model was well suited for disaster 
operations of limited scale and duration. Local commanders could initiate a response by 
deploying any and all SAR resources immediately in an effort to save lives.106  
During these disasters, the USCG’s response would focus mainly on the maritime 
aspects of the disaster in which they already had statutory responsibilities and capabilities, 
such as SAR in the coastal area. Title 14 U.S.C. 88 provides the USCG with the authority 
to conduct SAR and perform any and all acts necessary to rescue or aid persons in distress 
upon the high seas or imperiled by flood waters.107 As such, the Coast Guard’s authority 
to conduct maritime SAR operations is continuous, rather than dependent on the 
implementation of the NRF or a presidential disaster declaration under the Stafford Act. 
This response posture mirrors that of other local first responders, but contrasts sharply with 
other federal government organizations, which require a Stafford Act disaster declaration, 
approval by the President, and a mission assignment and funding authorization by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).108 
 
105 Deputy Commandant for Operations, 14. 
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The Robert T. Stafford Act was amended in 2016 to allow potentially impacted 
states and territories the ability to request federal assistance before a disaster, such as a 
hurricane or inland flooding occurred.109 Prior to this amendment, the delay in processing 
and approving FEMA mission assignments was widely viewed as unacceptable.110 An 
example is the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
The USCS’s response to Katrina is one of the few success stories concerning the 
overall federal response to the disaster.111 The USCG was able to respond quickly under 
its own organic authorities and saved thousands of lives before most other federal agencies 
even began to arrive in the area, days after the storm made landfall. In reaction to this 
failure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded to widespread criticism 
and “took a number of steps to improve preparedness and responsiveness to disasters.”112 
The requirement and expectations imposed by DHS (post-Katrina) resulted in major 
impacts to the USCG’s response posture during disasters, which transformed the 
organization from a maritime response force to an essential component of the federal 
government’s response to disasters. This expanded role took on operational requirements 
as well, including the requirement to deploy resources to support disasters that primarily 
impact land areas (e.g., USCG aircraft to transport disaster supplies and conduct aerial 
damage survey, and USCG aircraft and small boats to rescue stranded people from flooded 
areas).113 The current NRF identifies the USCG as one of the primary agencies for 
providing resources and coordinating the overall response to SAR during disasters under 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9.114 
 
109 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Stafford Act, as Amended, and Related Authorities, vol. 
FEMA P-592 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), https://www.fema.gov/sites/
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2. Emergency Support Function #9 
ESF #9 (Search and Rescue Annex) provides context for the deployment of federal 
resources that support SAR under the NRF, National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP), and 
U.S. National SAR Supplement (NSS). During incidents requiring a unified SAR response, 
the ESF Coordinator (FEMA) designates lifesaving responsibility to primary agencies that 
can provide specialized SAR capabilities.115 Primary agencies identified in ESF #9 are 
assigned by the operational needs and classification of the incident. According ESF #9, the 
three incident classifications and their associated primary agencies are the following: 
• Structural Collapse Urban Search and Rescue (US&R): primary 
agency is FEMA and “includes operations for natural and manmade 
disasters and catastrophic incidents, as well as other structural collapse 
operations that primarily require Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) US&R task 
force operations.”116 
• Maritime/Coastal/Waterborne SAR: primary agency is the USCG and 
“includes operations for natural and manmade disasters that primarily 
require air, cutter, boat, and response team [s]” for maritime response 
operations.117 
• Land SAR: primary agency designation is shared between the 
Department of Interior (DoI), National Parks Service (NPS), and 
Department of Defense (DOD) and “includes operations that require 
aviation and ground forces to meet mission objectives, other than 
maritime/coastal/waterborne and structural collapse SAR operations.”118 
 
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
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SAR services provided under ESF #9 include, but are not limited to, “distress 
monitoring; incident communications; locating distressed personnel; and coordinating and 
executing rescue operations, including extrication and/or evacuation.”119 
3. National Search and Rescue Plan for the United States
In addition to ESF #9, the U.S. NSP, “assigns SAR responsibilities to federal 
agencies with the authority to conduct SAR operations.”120 The National SAR Plan for the 
United States is the interagency approved policy for coordinating national SAR 
capabilities. This plan calls for all participants (signatories) to use “all available resources 
in all types of SAR operations to enable the United States to satisfy its humanitarian, 
national, and international commitments and obligations.”121  
However, the National SAR Plan is written in a way that it does not contravene the 
responsibilities and legal authorities for any participant who normally assists persons in 
distress, and maintains that state and local authorities should normally retain SAR 
responsibilities during local incidents.122  
These various levels of policy and guidance regarding SAR operations during 
disasters create confusion during large-scale maritime SAR events, such as those present 
after hurricanes, because the USCG has the organic authority and responsibility to respond 
and will be designated as the primary agency for maritime SAR disasters. However, state 
and local authorities still have responsibilities under the National SAR Plan, which often 
leads to parallel SAR efforts from the state and federal officials during the same incident. 
Additionally, the National SAR Plan states that participants of the plan are 
encouraged to support each other, as well as state and local authorities during SAR 
operations when applicable, and that participants are encouraged to use their SAR 
119 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
120 National Search and Rescue Committee, United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to 
the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2018), 76, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/
NSS_2018_Version/National%20SAR%20Plan%202018.pdf. 
121 National Search and Rescue Committee, National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States, 1. 
122 National Search and Rescue Committee, 4. 
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capabilities to support ESF #9. However, confusion still exists whenever ESF #9 is 
activated. FEMA is the coordinating agency responsible for response activities under ESF 
#9, and the USCG is only designated the primary agency if ESF #9 is activated for maritime 
SAR vice US&R or land SAR. However, maritime SAR needs are often widespread in the 
aftermath of a hurricane, and while some areas may receive a disaster declaration, 
prompting ESF #9 activation with FEMA coordination, others may not. Yet, these areas 
may still need a maritime SAR response, regardless of a disaster declaration, and the USCG 
is still responsible for carrying out SAR missions in these areas under statutory mandates. 
C. SUMMARY 
The USCG carries out SAR activities as one of its 11 statutory missions, in support 
of international and domestic obligations, with the overall goal of leveraging USCG assets 
and resources to prevent the loss of life whenever possible. The USCG’s SAR mission is 
primarily coordinated by sectors that align with internationally recognized SRRs. 
However, each sector carries out the USCG’s SAR mission by focusing on the four SAR 
tasks of distress monitoring and communications, search planning and preparation, SAR 
coordination, and SAR operations.  
The USCG’s SAR mission is a demand driven mission conducted daily, and when 
necessary, as part of larger disaster response operations. Additionally, the USCG’s SAR 
mission is essentially the same regardless if it is conducted during steady state operations 
or during disasters, except for the one new mission variant of SAR of individuals from 
floodwaters in urban areas, which requires different knowledge, skills, training, and 
equipment. Lastly, the Coast Guard’s authority to carry out maritime SAR operations is 
continuous, rather than dependent on the implementation of the NRF, or a presidential 
disaster declaration under the Stafford Act. However, despite the various levels of policy 
and guidance regarding SAR operations during disasters, confusion still exists between 
federal, state, and local officials during disaster operations that require a maritime SAR 
response, which often results in a lack of coordination and a duplication of SAR response 
efforts. 
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research question for this thesis is: How can the United States Coast Guard 
better engage organized spontaneous volunteers who conduct search and rescue during 
hurricane response operations?  
To answer this question, an exploratory case study methodology was used to 
analyze the organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs who conducted maritime 
SAR operations during three separate disasters. The organizational response of both the 
USCG and OSVs was analyzed according to the DRC’s four-fold typology of organized 
responses to disasters (discussed in Chapter II), in hopes of identifying specific factors of 
the USCG’s organizational response that affected OSV engagement. The intent of this 
analysis was to inquire if certain USCG organizational responses were more conducive 
than others were for engaging OSVs. The cases studied were Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017, and the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11. 
A. EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Case study research was developed in the social sciences. It is useful for capturing 
the complexities of a given case. An exploratory case study is a type of case study that 
examines phenomena that lack existing detailed primary research or a developed 
hypothesis that can be tested. Exploratory case study research can be used as a preliminary 
step towards discovering causal relationships or explanations when the data required for 
hypothetical formulation is not already available.123 Insights can then be developed, which 
can later be generalized and used for generating new theories.124 One of the most 
prominent authorities on case study research, Robert Yin, describes exploratory case 
studies as a way to scope pertinent questions and develop a new hypothesis for consecutive 
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studies.125 This research sought to use an exploratory case study methodology to inquire 
how the organizational response of the USCG affected organized spontaneous volunteer 
engagement.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The underlying assumption was that the organizational response of the USCG 
during each event did have some effect on the level of OSV engagement; however, this 
research and analysis aimed to identify how and why. Additionally, it is certainly plausible 
that OSVs may have some effect on the USCG as well. However, this research only focused 
on how the USCG’s organizational response affected OSVs, and not the other way around 
because the goal of this research project was to offer recommendations for how the USCG 
could better engage OSVs, and not how OSVs could better engage the USCG. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
While an exploratory case study methodology is well suited for this project, it is 
unable to account for every possible instance of spontaneous volunteerism during each 
disaster. The scope of this research project was focused only on OSVs who either formed 
a group or pseudo group that could be identified and classified according to the DRC 
typology of organized responses to disasters. Additionally, OSVs can develop in the 
response or recovery stage of a disaster and these volunteers can conduct a multitude of 
tasks including but not limited to SAR, sheltering and caring for victims, food and supply 
distribution, donation management, counseling services, etc. However, this research only 
focused on OSVs during the response phase of disaster management and specifically only 
on OSVs who conducted maritime SAR tasks.  
Additionally, the disasters studied for this research project took place over a two-
decade timespan that coincided with the evolution and rapid change of the U.S. disaster 
management system. It is important to note that the evolution of the disaster management 
system and federal mandates to adopt NIMS has influenced the organizational response 
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and mission set of the USCG over time. The Appendix provides a more comprehensive 
review of the evolution of the U.S. disaster response system.  
Lastly, this research is not a critique of past disasters in which OSVs conducted 
maritime SAR operations, nor is it a comprehensive review of the actions taken in each 
disaster by the USCG or OSV groups. Along that line, this research did not examine 
privacy, safety, or legal concerns regarding OSVs carrying out SAR related tasks during 
disasters. While those inquiries are worthy of future research, they are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
D. DATA COLLECTION  
The three cases used for analysis were the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11, 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Hurricane Harvey in 2017. In each case, both the USCG 
and OSVs carried out maritime SAR tasks, and both organizations were credited with 
saving lives. These cases were selected due to their varying geographical areas and varying 
scope and scale of maritime SAR operations. One case was caused by a terrorist attack and 
two involved substantial inland flooding caused by hurricanes, which made landfall 13 
years apart. Case study data for this research included books, government reports, journal 
articles, incident after action reports, newspaper articles, and various websites. Preference 
was given to sources that contained first-hand accounts of events and peer-reviewed 
academic writings.  
E. DATA ANALYSIS 
To answer the overall research question of how can the USCG better engage OSVs 
who conduct SAR during hurricane response operations, this thesis conducted an 
exploratory case study to identify and analyze SAR tasks undertaken during each event, 
and to determine which organization (USCG/OSV) carried out each task. This exploratory 
case study focused on identifying the four tasks routinely carried out by the USCG during 
SAR missions, which include distress monitoring and communications, search planning 
and preparedness, SAR coordination, and SAR operations. Once SAR tasks were 
identified, an analysis was conducted to determine what factors contributed to or hindered 
the SAR response efforts of each organization. Additionally, the organizational response 
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of both the USCG and OSVs was analyzed according to the DRC’s four-fold typology of 
organized responses to disasters to identify specific factors of the USCG’s organizational 
response that affected OSV engagement.  
This DRC typology analysis was conducted by examining each SAR task to 
determine if it was a regular or non-regular task for the organization carrying it out, and to 
determine if the organizational structures used to carry out each SAR task were in place 
prior to the disaster, or if they were created as a result of the disaster itself. Ultimately, this 
DRC typology analysis led to a typology identification for each organization according to 
the DRC typology of organized responses to disasters, and the intent of this analysis and 
typology identification was to inquire if certain USCG organizational responses were more 
conducive than others were in engaging OSVs. 
F. OUTCOMES 
This exploratory research and analysis hoped to identify patterns and trends in the 
USCG’s organizational response to disasters, and highlight factors that either increased or 
decreased the level of OSV engagement with the USCG. The DRC typology of organized 
responses to disasters was chosen as a framework because analyzing the organizational 
response of both the USCG and OSVs based on tasks, and organizational structures used 
to carry out those tasks, provided a useful cross-case analysis to understand how the 
organizational response of the USCG affected OSV engagement. 
Understanding how the organizational response of the USCG affects OSVs not only 
provides a better foundational understanding of cross-organizational dynamics during 
disaster response, but this knowledge can be leveraged to implement new strategies and 
response policies that can better integrate OSVs into future USCG response operations. 
Furthermore, state, local, or tribal organizations could also find value in understanding how 
their own organizational response to disasters might affect organized spontaneous 
volunteer engagement. Especially, since these organizations are expected to manage 
complex and dynamic events without outside assistance for at least the first few days 
following a disaster. 
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V. MARITIME DISASTER CASE STUDIES: OVERVIEW, 
BACKGROUND, AND ANALYSIS OF SAR RESPONSE 
This chapter examines three case studies in which both the USCG and OSVs 
conducted maritime SAR as part of the overall disaster response. Each case study provides 
a brief background of the case, an analysis of the SAR response by both the USCG and 
OSVs, and concludes with an overall assessment of factors that contributed or hindered the 
response efforts of each organization. 
A. LOWER MANHATTAN BOAT LIFT ON 9/11 
The Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11 is the story of the maritime SAR operations 
that were part of the overall events of that day. What started out as an ordinary Tuesday 
morning quickly developed into: 
The largest sea evacuation in history, larger than the evacuation of Dunkirk 
in World War II, where 339,000 British and French soldiers were rescued 
over the course of nine days. On 9/11 nearly 500,000 civilians were rescued 
from Manhattan, by boat, it took less than nine hours.126 
Notably, by all accounts, no significant accidents or injuries occurred even though 
people were embarking on a makeshift flotilla of vessels (some of which were not designed 
to carry passengers, i.e., tug boats) from embarkation points not designed for transferring 
personnel, and under extreme conditions of urgency and uncertainty.127 
1. Background 
The Borough of Manhattan is the heart of New York City and is the epicenter for 
much of the global financial world; however, people may forget that it is also an island. 
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Once it was clear that America was under a terrorist attack, officials in New York closed 
all forms of mass transit in and out of the city, which included bridges and subway tunnels. 
For the first time in over a century, the only way on or off the island of Manhattan was by 
water.128 With all forms of mass transit shut down, people trying to evacuate the area now 
known as “Ground Zero” were trapped.  
Individuals who headed south of Ground Zero wound up at the southernmost tip of 
Manhattan in an area called Battery Park, which has the Hudson River on one side and the 
East River on the other (Figure 2). Despite being trapped, people kept streaming in. From 
the relative safety of the water, many civilian boat captains saw these trapped individuals 
and began piloting their vessels up against the seawall to rescue them.129 This was the 
beginning of the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11.  
 




Figure 2. Map of Lower Manhattan.130  
2. Analysis of SAR Response 
The following analysis is broken down according to the SAR tasks of distress 
monitoring and communications, search planning and preparedness, SAR coordination, 
and SAR operations, to highlight which organization carried out each SAR task, as well as 
to identify the organizational structures used to carry out each task. 
 
130 Source: Jay Moon, “9/11 Boatlift: The Largest Marine Evacuation in History,” INSH (blog), 
August 1, 2019, https://insh.world/history/the-great-boat-lift-of-911/. 
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a. Distress Monitoring and Communications 
The first SAR task is distress monitoring and communication, and Captain Patrick 
Harris was likely the first person to report to the USCG that a plane had struck the twin 
towers. He made his report via a maritime VHF-FM radio directly from a small marina on 
the western shore of Manhattan from his sailing vessel Ventura.131 However, either due to 
his unprecedented nature of the distress call, or the fact that it was not recognized as a 
pending maritime evacuation event, the USCG personnel who received the call responded 
with a vague acknowledgment that they would alert the appropriate departments.132 
Without the realization that a maritime evacuation was developing, the USCG was at best 
delayed, or at worst, never issued a traditional UMIB to solicit the assistance of nearby 
vessels.133 However, the lack of an initial UMIB did not matter because mariners near 
lower Manhattan were witnessing the devastation unfold firsthand and began taking action 
without being officially requested to do so. According to a study by Kendra and 
Watchendorf, this situation was a case of distributive sense-making. Distributive sense-
making occurs when a group of individuals become aware of a particular event, identify 
the needs of those around them, and the potential actions to fulfil those needs.134 During 
the 9/11 Boat Lift, mariners recognized that individuals were trapped and needed to be 
evacuated, without receiving a traditional request for aid from the USCG or others, and 
self-organized to begin evacuating lower Manhattan with their own vessels. This group 
emergence took place before the USCG could initiate a formal response. 
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b. Search Planning and Preparedness and SAR Coordination 
The second and third SAR tasks are search planning and preparedness and SAR 
coordination. These two tasks took place almost simultaneously during the Lower 
Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11, and began with the efforts of USCG Lieutenant Mike Day 
and Sandy Hook harbor pilot Andrew McGovern.  
Lieutenant Day was Chief of Waterways Oversight for the Port of New York and 
New Jersey in 2001, and on the morning of 9/11, was receiving a daily briefing at the Coast 
Guard command center on Staten Island. During the briefing, it was reported that a small 
plane had just struck the World Trade Center. Acting on this information, Day dispatched 
a USCG small boat to check out the situation, but at the time, believed it to be a “non-
maritime event,” which would not require a full USCG response.135 However, once the 
second plane struck, it was clear that more was going to be needed. 
Lieutenant Day grabbed several planning and preparedness documents as he headed 
to the area to get a handle on the situation. These documents were harbor charts, a plan for 
Operation Sail (OpSail), and a response plan for (at the time) the worst-case scenario, a 
capsized Staten Island Ferry during wintertime.136 OpSail is a citywide event in which tall 
ships, warships, and yachts from all around the world converge on New York Harbor, and 
the planning documents for the event contained information about potential staging areas 
and emergency medical care locations around the harbor. The capsized ferry response plan 
provided guidance on recovering 6,000 people from freezing waters before hypothermia 
set in.137 It is important to note that neither of these plans addressed the risk assessment 
and planning process that typically takes place during a USCG SAR mission. At best, these 
plans could only be used as a starting point for the 9/11 Boat Lift, because at the time, no 
plan existed with detailed guidance on how to conduct a waterborne evacuation of 
Manhattan. The lack of advanced planning was not the only challenge that the USCG faced, 
as immediate planning was also lacking. “Planning” consisted of mostly an “uncontested 
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decision to do something,” and for a period of time, (at least at the onset) converges had 
the flexibility to define SAR operations however they deemed necessary.138 
Once Day arrived on scene, he noted that one of the most immediate problems was 
the coordination of maritime traffic in the harbor. Day noted that ferries, water taxies, 
dinner boats, and private vessels of all types had already “started to undertake their own 
rescue missions.”139 In an attempt at command and control, the Coast Guard tried to assign 
VHF-FM radio channels for different groups; however, communications quickly broke 
down. Realizing this, Day and his team decided they needed, “more durable 
communications and a recognizable command post.”140 They also realized that they 
needed to be more flexible than usual with the rules of the harbor. At some point during 
the morning, Day connected with harbor pilot Andrew McGovern, who chaired a Harbor 
Safety Committee on which Day served. McGovern reached out to the marine 
superintendent for the pilots’ headquarters and asked them to bring the 200-foot pilot boat 
New York to Manhattan. McGovern thought the pilot boat would make a good command 
post, because it had several radios, radars, and offered a 360-degree view from its 
bridge.141 McGovern also asked Day for some Coast Guard personnel to accompany the 
pilot boat and noted that people would respond better to someone in uniform.142 In a 
substantial departure from Coast Guard procedure, Lieutenant Day decided to use the pilot 
boat New York as a joint command post with coordination between the USCG and harbor 
pilots. Day also hoisted a Coast Guard flag up on the pilot boat and was quoted as saying, 
“I wouldn’t say we deputized it, but we took it over” clarifying “it was not fully taking it 
over, but the pilot boat with the Coast Guard flag symbolized the cooperation between the 
two entities.”143 This moment marked the beginning of the joint SAR coordination that 
would follow throughout the rest of the day.  
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Lieutenant Day also “recognized the immense amount of knowledge that the Sandy 
Hook Pilots brought to the table,” already having a close working relationship with them 
due to previously spending eight months in an industry exchange program with the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey.144 The goal of this industry exchange program 
was to foster a stronger relationship between the maritime industry and the Coast Guard, 
because the relationship between the two is often challenging. The maritime industry fully 
supports the SAR aspect of the Coast Guard, but often resents the regulatory oversight and 
law enforcement aspects of the Coast Guard.145 This exchange program attempted to 
bridge this gap by creating a partnership in the port, with the emphasis on collaboration 
and joint problem solving.  
Day anticipated the harbor pilots would offer more situational awareness than Coast 
Guard officers would, “because of their experience with a vast range of vessels in the 
harbor and because of their relationship with the maritime community.”146 During the 
maritime evacuation, each organization had something to offer, and based on the 
combination of personal networks, statutory authority, credibility, and equipment, the 
coordination really came together and culminated in the shared space of the pilot boat New 
York. 
c. SAR Operations 
The final SAR task is SAR operations, and on 9/11, maritime SAR operations were 
carried out by over 150 vessels consisting of ferryboats, tug boats, Coast Guard boats, and 
even privately owned recreational boats that all converged at once. While independent SAR 
operations were taking place prior to Coast Guard involvement, the primary catalyst for 
the emergence of a coordinated effort was when Lieutenant Day and harbor pilot Andrew 
McGovern decided that some form of coordination needed to be established. While not a 
traditional UMIB, they decided to put out a radio broadcast for assistance. Day chose to 
make a broadcast requesting that “all available boats” able to assist with the evacuation of 
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Manhattan to please report to Governors Island.147 This call was transmitted to all vessels 
in the area equipped with a maritime radio, although evidence exists that not everyone 
heard the call.148 Using the already established maritime VHF-FM radio system to 
communicate with participants of the evacuation was vital. VHF-FM channels 13 and 16 
are the maritime calling and distress frequencies, respectfully, and are available to anyone 
with access to a maritime radio. All Coast Guard vessels, police and fire vessels, and 
commercial vessels have a maritime radio capable of operating on channels 13 and 16, as 
well as many recreational vessels that choose to invest in one. Having a common 
communications channel solved many of the interoperability issues of the 9/11 Boat Lift; 
however, at times, excess transmissions did hamper communications.149 
To combat the communication challenges or to decentralize command and control, 
vessels arriving at Governor’s Island were either tasked with evacuating certain areas or 
were placed on specific routes. Harbor pilots were able to identify the vessels’ capabilities 
quickly just by looking at them, and could direct the boats where they could best be used. 
It is important to note that some of the smaller recreational vessels that responded were re-
directed or escorted out of the area by the USCG, either due to their limited capability, or 
out of safety concerns.150 Once directed on a route, these vessels went back and forth all 
day long trying to evacuate as many people as they could. “You could not have planned 
anything that happened that quick,” noted Engineer Robin Jones, onboard the tug Mary 
Gellatly.151 The event was described as people just having to do what they had to do; 
average people stepping up when they needed to. The decision to use the pilot boat New 
York as a floating command post was not the only departure from USCG procedure that 
happened that day.  
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Vincent Ardolino, the Captain of Amberjack V, recalled the USCG stating, “not 
how many people are you allowed to carry, how many people you can fit?”152 During 
normal operations, the USCG regulates a vessel’s max passenger capacity. However, on 9/
11, the individual captains themselves were determining max passenger capacity. One 
captain was reported as yelling out the bridge window to cut off passengers at about 300.153 
While overloading a vessel is technically a violation of USCG regulations and federal law, 
captains intentionally broke the law, but did so purposefully. Despite intentionally 
overloading their vessels, caution was not thrown to the wind. Organization and a concern 
for safety were still enforced, with various accounts of crews telling passengers where to 
sit (for stability reasons) and providing lifejackets and safety briefings.154  
Certainly, the USCG could have taken over the evacuation efforts, at least in 
principal, because of its statutory authority and responsibility for maritime SAR. However, 
the USCG needed the resources and connections that the commercial maritime community 
brought to bear to conduct a successful operation, and in the case of 9/11, the USCG and 
harbor pilots carried out these SAR operations jointly. In reality, the USCG was dispersing 
its authority to others.155 An account even surfaced of a USCG officer giving his official 
ball cap and lifejacket to a harbor pilot stating, “you’re in the Coast Guard if anybody 
asks,” even though it is a federal offense to impersonate a Coast Guard officer.156 A harbor 
pilot at Battery Park described the coordination amongst the various vessels as a 
decentralized unity of effort, and noted that some mariners participating in the evacuation 
were not even aware that the USCG was involved. Another described Lieutenant Day’s 
actions as being part of the team and allowing the process to unfold, rather than trying to 
take charge of it.157 Admiral James Loy, the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, 
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described the event as “the Coast Guard and the whole maritime community of the Port of 
New York and New Jersey, standing up and recognizing what had to be done.”158 
3. Summary 
As previously noted, a perception exists that spontaneous volunteers will hamper 
the disaster response by causing a breakdown of command and control. However, very 
little evidence suggests that any of these problems occurred during the Lower Manhattan 
Boat Lift on 9/11. In fact, the evacuation could not have succeeded without the efforts of 
OSVs, and in many cases, these individuals brought with them special knowledge, skills, 
and abilities that enabled the USCG to succeed.159 The willingness of the USCG to allow 
for a decentralized response is one of the major successes of the case, and is a contributing 
factor that allowed the emergence of a new group to form. 
B. HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, one of the most devastating storms in U.S. 
history, made landfall along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The sheer 
magnitude of the storm itself, and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, posed 
challenges for responders at the federal, state, and local levels.160 The city of New Orleans, 
which is already six feet below sea level, was inundated with storm surge and rising 
floodwaters, which were exacerbated by the failure of the levee system surrounding the 
city.161 Despite the calls for evacuation, nearly 60,000 people were unable or unwilling to 
leave, and once the levee system broke, 80 percent of the city was submerged with up to 
27 feet of water, which created the need for a massive SAR operation.162 
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1. Background 
On August 23, 2005, Tropical Storm Katrina developed near the Bahamas, and over 
the next few days, strengthened into a Category 1 hurricane. Hurricane Katrina made its 
initial landfall in Florida. However, once the storm crossed over Florida and into the Gulf 
of Mexico, it quickly strengthened into a catastrophic Category 5 storm fueled by the warm 
waters of the Gulf. Hurricane Katrina made its second landfall over Louisiana and 
Mississippi and left “a trail of heartbreaking devastation and human suffering.”163 
Emergency plans at all levels of government were tested during Katrina, and in 
many cases, local and state recourses were overwhelmed or incapacitated due to damaged 
facilities, power loss, and communication outages. The disaster required an unprecedented 
federal level response.164 However, federal response efforts were for the most part viewed 
as slow, highly inefficient, and ineffective; with the exception that the USCG was 
applauded for its forward leaning posture in initiating SAR operations immediately 
following the storm.165 With the vast majority of government responders struggling to 
respond effectively to the SAR needs of the event, an OSV group emerged to fulfill these 
needs, perceived or real.  
Hurricane Katrina was responsible for the death of over 1,600 people, a vast 
majority of those (almost 80%) being in the New Orleans metropolitan area.166 However, 
this death rate would have been significantly higher if not for the efforts of an OSV group. 
These OSVs piloted their flat bottom boats through the flooded city streets to locate and 
rescue individuals trapped in their homes or on rooftops.167 This spontaneous volunteer 
effort, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, was the birth of the Cajun Navy. 
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2. Analysis of SAR Response 
The following analysis is broken down according to the SAR tasks of distress 
monitoring and communications, search planning and preparedness, SAR coordination, 
and SAR operations, to highlight which organization carried out each SAR task, as well as 
to identify the organizational structures used to carry out each task. 
a. Distress Monitoring and Communications 
The first SAR task is distress monitoring and communication, and this task started 
well before Katrina made landfall. The National Weather Service monitored the storm 
since its formation near the Bahamas, and released a total of 61 advisories over a period of 
seven days, as Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.168 In response to these advisories, 
government officials began preparing for Katrina’s imminent landfall to include declaring 
states of emergency, activating emergency response functions, and pre-positioning 
response assets. Additionally, the State of Louisiana took steps to begin evacuations, and 
determined that an evacuation of New Orleans would be required.169 
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 
both declared a state of emergency for their respective states, and at the request of Governor 
Blanco, President Bush signed an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana before 
the storm even made landfall, which at the time was rare.170 The federal government 
responded to this emergency declaration by activating emergency support functions and 
issuing mission assignments, and FEMA began coordinating federal SAR resources from 
the Coast Guard, FEMA US&R Task Forces, and the DOD.171 
Despite these preparations at the federal, state, and local levels, once Katrina hit, 
local responders were left with damaged infrastructure and an inoperable communications 
network. Neither the 911-call centers, nor the public safety radio system, were functioning 
 
168 Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 22. 
169 Townsend, 25. 
170 Townsend, 24–27. 
171 Townsend, 38. 
53 
properly. Additionally, the State of Louisiana’s 800 MHz interoperability radio system (a 
system used to coordinate response efforts across the state) was not operable for several 
days after the storm.172 With the 911 system down, people began calling into local radio 
and television stations to explain their situation and plea for help, and these calls were 
broadcast live over the air.173 
Seeing this devastation unfold, former Senator Nick Gautreaux was contacted by 
Walter Boasso (another Senator who previously served with Gautreax) stating, “My people 
are dying. I need help.”174 In response, “Gautreaux put out his own plea” for help, and his 
request was sent out by local media asking for “anyone [who] wants to go help the people 
of New Orleans [to] please come to the Acadiana Mall” in Lafayette.175 According to 
journalist Trent Angers, the thought was that around 25 boats might show up; however, 
between 350 and 400 boats actually came.176 This eight-mile convoy rolled out of 
Lafayette towards New Orleans to initiate a citizen-led SAR response. This makeshift 
flotilla of OSVs would later become known as the “Cajun Navy.” 
With emergency call centers unable to receive requests for help, and no local 
command and control element present to direct rescuers (USCG or OSVs) to where they 
were needed upon arrival, rescue crews were forced to go from house-to-house looking for 
trapped individuals themselves, and trapped individuals had to find ways to communicate 
their distress directly to the rescuers. Jason Dorval, a USCG helicopter pilot, reported that 
individuals trapped on their roofs or in their attics were signaling for help by waiving their 
arms or shining flashlights, and David Billeaud, one of the OSV rescuers, noted that graffiti 
was written across rooftops saying, “help us.”177 
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b. Search Planning and Preparedness 
The second SAR task is search planning and preparedness, and as the flooding in 
New Orleans worsened, state and local officials continued with their evacuation efforts; 
however, neither the state of Louisiana, nor the City of New Orleans, had a plan for how 
to evacuate the city after a storm’s landfall. In lieu of a plan, officials relied on FEMA, the 
DOD, and the USCG to conduct all post-landfall evacuations.178 
Each hurricane season (June 1st–November 30th), Coast Guard units across the 
nation prepare for hurricane response operations by revising their hurricane plans. The 
USCG was already in a high state of readiness prior to Katrina because 2005 was an active 
hurricane season.179 USCG District Eight (located in New Orleans) and USCG Sector New 
Orleans had already updated their hurricane plans, verified contact information for area 
stakeholders, developed personnel deployment rosters, and held a tabletop exercise to 
ensure that their planning efforts were comprehensive and attainable.180 
Once Katrina’s landfall was forecasted along the Gulf Coast, USCG units in the 
area began activating their respective hurricane plans. District 8 established an incident 
management team (IMT) on August 27th (two days before landfall), and closed the 
entrance to the lower Mississippi River.181 Once storm tracks indicated that New Orleans 
would be directly impacted, District Eight also decided to implement its Continuity of 
Operations Plan and established another IMT in St. Louis, MO.182 Additionally, in 
preparation for a large-scale disaster response operations, District Eight and Sector New 
Orleans also requested assistance from the Atlantic Area Incident Management Assist 
Team, which aids local commanders with incident management using NIMS and ICS.183  
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In preparation of post-landfall SAR operations, USCG Disaster Assistance 
Response Teams and aircraft were mobilized from across the Coast Guard and staged 
outside the storm’s impact area so that they could immediately respond as soon as it was 
safe to do so.184 Lastly, anticipating that communication failures would be inevitable, 
contingency communication vehicles were pre-staged to assist with the command and 
control aspects of the SAR response.185 
The USCG’s SAR planning and preparedness efforts during Hurricane Karina were 
much like that of any other hurricane response. Planning and preparedness consisted of 
pre-planning and asset staging in anticipation of SAR operations, rather than real time 
planning for known SAR cases, which would normally take place during steady state SAR 
operations. In contrast, OSVs emerged during the response phase of Katrina, and as such, 
no pre-planning was possible because the organization did not exist prior to the disaster 
itself.  
c. SAR Coordination 
The third SAR task is SAR coordination, and during Katrina, very little if any 
coordination took place. This lack of coordination was present in both internal government 
coordination efforts, and external coordination efforts with OSVs.  
Katrina highlighted the need for greater internal government coordination between 
the components of the U.S. SAR system, US&R, and civil SAR.186 According to the 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lesson Learned report: 
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US&R refers to the specialized mission of rescuing victims trapped in 
collapsed structures. In contrast, SAR constitutes all other missions, such as 
maritime, aeronautical, and land rescues. However, there is no overarching 
plan that incorporates both aspects of search and rescue. The absence of 
such a plan led to coordination problems between US&R teams and SAR 
teams. Some teams displayed their own initiative to fill the gap in unified 
command, determining their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and 
locations to drop off the people they rescued.187 
A clear disconnect occurred between FEMA US&R teams and the USCG during 
Katrina, because each organization trains for a very different mission set. For example, 
FEMA US&R teams were (at the time) not trained or equipped to perform water rescues. 
This lack of training created a challenging situation, because these US&R teams were sent 
in as a federal resource to conduct SAR operations that they were unable to perform.188 
The fragmented deployment of federal resources during Katrina was not exclusive 
to DHS.189  
There was [also] a lack of clear search and rescue guidance across [other 
federal] agencies because the National Response Plan and the National 
Search and Rescue Plan had never been fully integrated.190 
This lack of integrated effort, or coordination, between national level SAR 
organizations resulted in two separate command centers being established to oversee SAR 
operations in New Orleans alone, one by the Louisiana National Guard and the other by 
the USCG.191 Additionally, this lack of coordination or integration is best highlighted by 
the observation that Army helicopters were deployed to conduct SAR operations. They 
lacked, however, the capability to hoist people from rooftops, and could only conduct 
evacuations if they could find a safe place to land.192 Furthermore, the DOD deployed both 
active duty and National Guard resources; however, Title 32 (National Guard) forces were 
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coordinated by the state National Guard Bureau, whereas Title 10 (active duty) forces were 
coordinated by USNORTHCOM.193 This conflicting language in the National Response 
Plan (NRP) and the National SAR Plan resulted in various governmental organizations 
conducting independent SAR operations, which resulted in multiple resources being sent 
to the same area, or not being sent to areas where they were needed.194  
It should be noted that the Coast Guard did attempt some minor coordination efforts 
with local government responders. The Louisiana State Police and Louisiana Department 
of Wildlife and Fisheries were reported to have provided escorts for USCG personnel, or 
shared local knowledge on areas that still needed to be searched or where known 
individuals were trapped.195 However, this localized coordination occurred at the 
individual SAR responder level vice an organization level. 
Also, a lack of external coordination efforts with OSVs forced them to also conduct 
independent SAR operations. An estimated 400 boaters from the area surrounding 
Lafayette showed up to help, but public safety officials, not knowing how to coordinate 
with them, and fearing that the floodwaters were too dangerous, turned many of them away. 
Brian Smelker, an OSV from Lafayette, recalls Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries officers telling his group, “it was too dangerous to proceed” and “we don’t need 
you.”196 This statement resulted in many OSVs turning around and going home; however, 
some refused to leave and worked their way past law enforcement officials through 
backroads until they came to the I-10 and I-610 intersection, where the floodwaters had 
turned the interstate ramp into a makeshift boat launch to initiate their SAR operations.197 
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d. SAR Operations 
The final SAR task is SAR operations and both the USCG and OSVs were 
instrumental in conducting SAR during Katrina, whereas local emergency response 
organizations struggled to perform this urgent mission. According to the Federal Response 
to Hurricane Katrina: Lesson Learned report, local responders found it impossible to 
establish functioning incident command structures, obtain situational awareness, manage 
assets, or direct operations, noting, “It was difficult for local leaders to guide the local 
response efforts, much less command them.”198  
In contrast, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published in July 
2006 stated: 
Of the estimated 60,000 people needing to be rescued from rooftops and 
flooded homes, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard…Underpinning 
these efforts were the agency’s operational principles that promote 
leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility and 
action.199 
Despite the USCG’s success during Katrina, and familiarity conducting daily SAR 
operations, the USCG was still presented with unique challenges that required innovative 
solutions and on-scene initiative to overcome. Most of these solutions came in the form of 
non-regular tasks. 
The day after Katrina hit, Air Station New Orleans had no power or water, and only 
had access to one tanker of aviation fuel. However, realizing that the Navy had locked up 
their fuel depot on the other side of the airfield (prior to evacuating), USCG Electricians 
Mate Rodney Gordon accessed the fuel depot, and used a scavenged generator, forklift, 
and electrical wire to restore power to the fuel pumps.200 With fuel now available, Air 
Station New Orleans re-established its Air Operations Center, and began directing 
incoming aircraft to, “go out over the city and rescue people.”201 Air Station New 
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Orleans’s five helicopters were responsible for rescuing over 15,000 people in a week, 
which is equivalent to their total number of rescues for the preceding 22 years.202  
Additional instances of on-scene initiative and innovation were noted when Jason 
Dorval, a Jayhawk helicopter pilot, concerned about the slow pace of hoist operations, 
decide to “[touch] his HH-60 down on the roof of a two-story hospital between two air-
conditioning units;” knowing that the roof could not support the full weight of the 
helicopter.203 Dorval deviated from normal operations by keeping the massive rotors 
turning, so the helicopter never fully came to rest on the roof, which allowed him to 
evacuate 12 people at a time.204 In another part of town, USCG aircrews received a 
warning that they should clear out of the area because people were shooting at rescue 
helicopters (a fact later disproven); however, many USCG pilots choose to ignore this 
warning by highlighting that “the Jayhawk is a variation of the Army Black Hawk” 
helicopter, which is “designed to take small arms fire.”205 Finally, a USCG C-130 pilot 
tasked with conducting an environmental survey decided that her aircraft would better be 
used as a communication platform, so she independently established an air control link 
between SAR helicopters, hospitals, and improvised landing zones.206 
USCG aircrews also had the non-regular task of hoisting people from their rooftops 
alongside power lines, debris, and other obstacles that would not be found in a typical 
maritime environment.207 Furthermore, USCG rescue personnel are not trained or 
equipped to rescue trapped individuals from their attics; however, they adapted and began 
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carrying axes “to break through rooftops.”208 USCG Aviation Survival Technician Joel 
Sayers, one of the rescuers lowered to a rooftop to rescue an elderly woman discovered 
that she had been able to squeeze through a small opening in the roof; however, “her 
husband was still trapped inside the broiling attic.”209 Unable to access the attic space, 
Sayers tied a cloth around a vent pipe on the roof and promised the man he would return. 
After dropping the woman off at an improvised landing zone, Sayers borrowed a fireman’s 
axe and returned to the roof to cut a hole large enough to rescue the man. This rescue was 
caught on video and made the evening rounds across national news networks.210 Shortly 
afterwards, USCG responders began equipping themselves with axes and light-gas 
powered chainsaws. USCG responders do not routinely carry these tools; however, during 
Katrina, they became valuable lifesaving equipment.211 
USCG boat crews also deviated from normal practices and conducted non-regular 
tasks. Petty Officer Jessica Guidroz, a crewmember aboard an 18-foot jet boat tasked with 
searching the Lakeview section of the city, by going house-to-house “knocking on roofs 
and attic windows looking for survivors,” recalls running over stop signs and parked cars 
as they navigated down the flooded streets and hoped that they did not punch a hole in the 
bottom of their boat.212 The USCG does not normally go door-to-door looking for people 
in distress, and most certainly, refrains from operating their vessels in areas where they 
could be damaged and possible sink. Lastly, USCG personnel bridged communication 
challenges during SAR operations by procuring two-way radios, using text messaging, and 
opening commercial e-mail accounts to share information.213 
Despite all the innovation and non-regular tasks undertaken by the USCG to carry 
out SAR operations, the USCG was unable to meet all the mission demands independently. 
By some reports, hundreds drowned after the levees broke and flooded much of the city, 
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and many more were still trapped by rising floodwaters.214 People needed help badly, and 
at the time, official responders could not deploy enough resources to locate and rescue 
everyone in need.215 During this time, OSVs stepped in to assist in the massive SAR 
response.  
Alan Durand, who directed a documentary on the efforts of the Cajun Navy during 
Katrina noted: 
Many more people would have died in the flood waters … if not for the 
hundreds of south Louisiana folks who met at Acadiana Mall in Lafayette 
and then hauled their boats to New Orleans, where they disregarded 
authorities’ orders to go back home.216 
Duran also noted that overall, the Cajun Navy was responsible for rescuing over 
10,000 people during Katrina, and highlighted that the organizer of the Cajun Navy, Doug 
Bienvenu, was responsible for rescuing hundreds of people himself, over a period of three 
days.217 
Notably, General Russel Honore, with the Louisiana National Guard, who 
commanded over 20,000 troops, 20 ships, and over 225 helicopters tasked with assisting 
in the SAR efforts during Katrina, “credits the Cajun Navy for doing much of the initial 
lifesaving,” and noted, “In reality most people are saved by neighbors and volunteers after 
a disaster than are saved by organized rescue people.”218 
3. Summary 
Hurricane Katrina created the need for a massive SAR operation; however, the way 
official responders, to include federal resources, reacted to this need, was for the most part, 
viewed as a failure. This failure resulted in the emergence of OSV groups that responded 
by conducting citizen-led SAR operations. While organized spontaneous volunteerism is 
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not new, a contributing factor that led to the emergence of the OSV group during Hurricane 
Katrina was a lack of internal government coordination efforts. While the number of OSV 
groups present during Hurricane Katrina was relatively small and external or cross-
organizational coordination efforts could have taken place, official responders were 
focused on the challenge of trying to coordinate with each other, rather than with OSVs. 
Additionally, a perception arose that OSVs were too novel to put actually any coordination 
efforts into them, and that they were more of a nuisance than a potential asset to be 
leveraged. 
Hurricane Katrina was also the first real test of the NRP implemented post-9/11, 
and as such, a faulty assumption might have existed that the NRP would effectively address 
all coordination efforts across federal level resources. However, in reality, “there was a 
lack of clear search and rescue guidance across agencies because the National Response 
Plan and the National Search and Rescue Plan … [were] never … fully integrated.”219 This 
lack of integration resulted in unclear roles and responsibilities for federal organizations 
that conduct SAR during disasters, and led to reduced capabilities in certain areas and a 
duplication of effort in others.  
C. HURRICANE HARVEY 
Hurricane Harvey hit Texas on August 25, 2017 as a Category 4 storm, and was the 
second most costly disaster in U.S. history, only surpassed by Hurricane Katrina in 
2005.220 Harvey made landfall three separate times over a period of six days. It stalled 
however for over 117 hours near the Houston area, which caused torrential rainfall and 
extreme flooding.221 In total, Harvey dumped 27 trillion gallons of water, and was one of 
the largest rain events ever recorded in history.222 Over 50 inches of rain fell in some parts 
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of the area that resulted in the National Weather Service having to “[add] extra colors to 
capture [the] rainfall totals” accurately.223 Additionally, according to geophysicist Chris 
Milliner, the flooding was so expansive that the weight of the water actually sank the city 
of Houston by nearly an inch.224 Similar to Hurricane Katrina, this extensive flooding 
resulted in the need for a massive SAR operation. 
1. Background 
Harvey began as a slow-moving tropical storm that originated on August 13, 2017, 
off the West Coast of Africa, but once the storm arrived in the Gulf of Mexico, it began to 
intensify and was officially classified as a Category 1 hurricane on August 24, 2017.225 
However, over the next 24 hours, Harvey continued to strengthen and grew into a major 
Category 4 storm before making its initial landfall.226 
Hurricane Harvey made its first and second landfalls over San Jose Island, followed 
by Rockport, TX, which impacted the area with 130-mph winds, heavy rain, and a 
devastating 13-foot storm surge.227 However, almost immediately after making landfall, 
Hurricane Harvey began weakening and stalled causing sustained downpours and immense 
flooding throughout the region. Some areas received between 25–50 inches of rainfall over 
a period of two days, which is more than the Houston area experiences annually.228 
Additionally, the excessive rainfall breached two flood-control reservoirs near Houston, 
which worsened the already intense flooding.229 Harvey made its third and final landfall 
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on August 30, 2017 as a tropical storm near Port Arthur, TX, while emergency responders 
were already trying to address existing SAR needs. By one report, over 10,000 SAR 
responses were underway prior to Harvey making its final landfall.230 In total, Harvey 
remained a tropical system that impacted the region for a week, before finally moving out 
of the area and dissipating.231 
While the unprecedented level of flooding caused by Hurricane Harvey in and 
around the Houston area was remarkable by itself, the application and use of digital 
technologies during the SAR response was quite noteworthy. Flood victims turned to social 
media for help at an alarming rate, which created challenges for established SAR 
organizations for which they were not prepared.232 According to Rob Dudgeon, an 
emergency management consultant, “This is a situation where technology and accepted 
norms of communication are outpacing government’s ability to manage.”233 While 
established SAR organizations struggled to adapt, OSV groups readily adapted and took 
action.  
2. Analysis of SAR Response 
The following analysis is broken down according to the SAR tasks of distress 
monitoring and communications, search planning and preparedness, SAR coordination, 
and SAR operations, to highlight which organization carried out each SAR task, as well as 
to identify the organizational structures used to carry out each task. 
a. Distress Monitoring and Communications 
The first SAR task is distress monitoring and communication, and as the 
floodwaters began to rise in Houston, people began calling for help, as they would during 
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Texas and Louisiana mostly remained intact; however, when people tried to call 911, they 
were met with varying levels of success. At least 17 emergency call centers experienced 
disruptions from the storm, and the ones that did not experience disruptions, still struggled 
due to the high call volume.234 At its peak, the Harris County 911 center, which covers the 
city of Houston, received approximately 80,000 calls in a 24-hour period, compared to its 
normal volume of around 8,000 calls a day.235 This extreme volume resulted in many 
people not being able to get through, or being placed on long holds. Some reports noted 
that it could take 45 minutes or longer to talk to a dispatcher, because the 911 call centers 
were so overwhelmed.236 It is important to note that the greater Harris County area has 30 
emergency call centers, and this emergency communications network is the largest in 
Texas, and one of the largest in the nation.237 However, despite the overall size and number 
of emergency call centers, the emergency communications network could not adequately 
address the volume of calls they were receiving. Houston’s Mayor, Sylvester Turner, noted 
that calls to emergency services had stretched the still operational call centers to capacity, 
and “urged residents who were not in life-threatening situations to stop calling emergency 
lines.”238 
Not being able to reach traditional emergency services, many trapped individuals 
turned to social media apps like Facebook, Twitter, and Nextdoor for help in hopes that 
someone would either relay their situation to local authorities, or could render assistance 
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directly.239 One Twitter post highlighted the desperation people were experiencing stating, 
“The water is swallowing us up. Please send help. 911 is not responding!!!!!!”240 With 
pleas for help showing up all over social media with the hashtags #SOSHouston and 
#SOSHarvey, a number of spontaneous digital volunteers (many from outside the disaster 
area itself) started relaying emergency calls into Houston’s 911 centers.241 However, an 
unexpected complication arose. Each social media post was widely shared and often 
resulted in multiple calls for the exact same incident.242 Joe Laud, administrative manager 
of the Houston Emergency Center, noted they preferred calls directly, because they would 
get multiple requests for the same incident, noting, “It’s hard to coordinate anything, 
especially in the social media world.”243 
In addition to relaying requests for help, many OSVs choose to initiate their own 
SAR responses based on the social media posts. For example, in the immediate aftermath 
of Harvey, the site Nextdoor, a popular social media site for neighbors to communicate 
with neighbors, reported an unprecedented number of users. The CEO of Nextdoor, Steve 
Wymer, noted, “We’re seeing people use our app if they can’t get through to 911… in very 
emergency, life-threatening situations.”244 In one particular post, someone wrote that they 
desperately needed a rescue and were headed to their roof. Wymer noted an immediate 
response that stated, “Unloading my canoe now. I’m headed your way.”245  
Seeing that people were turning away from traditional distress notification 
methods, Ed Gonzales, the sheriff for Harris County, TX, attempted to communicate 
directly with trapped individuals, through social media; however, many other official 
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emergency response organizations advised against using social media to request help. The 
Houston Police Department (HPD) directed people to call 911 for life-threating 
emergencies and tweeted out, “Please do not use the HPD social media accounts for rescue 
requests.”246 Additionally, the USCG warned against using social media to report distress 
and posted the following message to its Twitter feed (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. USCG Tweet during Hurricane Harvey.247 
According to emergency management consultant, Rob Dudgeon, it would be 
impractical if not impossible for emergency management officials to use social media for 
distress monitoring, because:  
It is literally trying to drink from a firehouse… It’s very labor intensive to 
watch and because of the thousand different ways people can hashtag 
something or keyword something, trying to sort out what’s relevant and 
what’s not and what’s actionable is very, very difficult.248 
Additionally, Adrienne Russell, a professor of media, technology, and society at 
the University of Washington noted, “the way social media is used during emergencies 
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fluctuates rapidly, so crisis response agencies have a tough time planning a proper social-
media strategy.”249 
In an attempt to help with the surge of calls that emergency call centers were 
receiving, the USCG sent out another social media post with the hashtag #HurricaneHarvey 
informing individuals who needed help that they could contact the Coast Guard directly.250 
However, as these distress calls directly to the USCG substantially increased, the local 
USCG sector also quickly became overwhelmed. Eventually, “all Coast Guard calls were 
routed to the Coast Guard’s National Command Center in Washington, DC, which set up 
a special triage unit to track calls and coordinate responses.”251  
b. Search Planning and Preparedness 
The second SAR task of search planning and preparedness was carried out similarly 
to previous hurricane responses. The USCG increased its seasonal hurricane alert status, 
and once a pending landfall was forecasted, began pre-planning and staging assets in 
anticipation of pending SAR operations. The USCG pre-deployed aircraft and shallow 
water response vessels capable of responding in flooded urban areas, and within 24 hours, 
gale force winds closed all ports in the Houston, Texas City, Galveston, Freeport, and the 
Corpus Christi area.252 Additionally, fearing a repeat of Katrina, government officials in 
Texas proactively began issuing evacuation orders and emergency declarations. Texas 
Governor Greg Abbott had already contacted the President and formally requested a federal 
disaster declaration prior to Harvey’s landfall, which was approved. FEMA Administrator 
Brock Long urged people to take evacuation orders seriously, stating, “This may be the 
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first major landfall hurricane we’ve had since 2005… [and] there’s going to be 
damage.”253 
In contrast, as during Hurricane Katrina, OSVs did not emerge until the response 
phase of the disaster; therefore, no pre-planning or preparedness activities were undertaken. 
However, it is important to note that the Cajun Navy originally developed during Katrina 
and was active the previous year during the 2016 floods in New Orleans. Therefore, the 
group could have undertaken some form of planning or preparedness activities, but no 
evidence exists that any pre-planning occurred. This lack of pre-planning most likely 
resulted because the Cajun Navy has grown from the initial 350 to 400 boats that showed 
up at the Acadiana Mall in Lafayette, LA to more of a label for many loosely affiliated 
OSV groups that originate from southern Louisiana vice a single fully formalized 
independent organization. 
c. SAR Coordination 
The third SAR task is SAR coordination, and while the disastrous effects of Harvey 
(with its massive inland flooding) were eerily similar to Hurricane Katrina, one thing was 
drastically different; that of the use of technology to support SAR coordination efforts. 
During Harvey, a substantial amount of coordination took place. However, this 
coordination for the most part was confined to either official internal government 
coordination efforts, or internal coordination efforts amongst OSV groups. Very limited 
external or cross-organizational coordination efforts occurred between official responders 
and OSVs.  
Back in Washington, DC, the special triage unit set up to support the USCG’s 
National Command Center was having difficulty accurately identifying areas that had the 
greatest SAR needs, due to the sheer number of calls coming in and the unit’s unfamiliarity 
with the local operating area. To address these challenges, the National Command Center 
turned to the Coast Guard’s geospatial intelligence team (GEOINT), which is part of the 
Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center. The Coast Guard’s GEOINT team is 
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embedded at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and conducts a myriad 
of geospatial analysis in support of USCG missions.254 Coordinating with the USCG’s 
liaison officer at the Emergency Operations Center in Houston, the GEOINT team was able 
to obtain 911 call logs that were used to create heat maps showing caller locations and the 
type of assistance they needed.255 However, it is important to note that the USCG’s 
GEOINT team is part of the intelligence community and not part of routine SAR response 
operations; as such, they are restricted from accessing personally identifiable information 
on U.S. persons. Therefore, all call logs had to be stripped of personal information before 
being sent to the GEOINT team, and this process took about 40 hours for each batch of 
data.256 Lastly, the call logs from the triage unit were also sanitized and provided to the 
GEOINT team to create a more comprehensive understanding of the total situation at hand. 
This heat map, comprised of data from distress calls to both local emergency call centers 
and directly to the USCG, was used by USCG District Eight and USCG Sector Houston/
Galveston to make resource allocation decisions.257 
Comparatively, OSVs also communicated and coordinated their collective SAR 
response efforts by leveraging technology. When Katrina struck in 2005, Twitter did not 
exist and “Facebook was still a private, school-only platform.”258 However, during 
Hurricane Harvey, the Cajun Navy and a similarly named group called the Louisiana Cajun 
Navy took to Facebook and Twitter to relay rescue information to each other.259 
Additionally, while Nextdoor, Facebook, Zello, and Twitter were used to conducting 
distress monitoring and communication, OSVs were also creating and sharing interactive 
crowdsourced rescue maps. Digital volunteers used hashtags to track and log rescue 
requests related to Harvey in a Google spreadsheet, and it is interesting to note that each 
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rescue request was logged by geographic location and assigned an incident number.260 The 
Cajun Navy and the Texas Navy (another grassroots OSV SAR organization) used this 
information collected in this Google spreadsheet to create a rescue map called “Hurricane 
Harvey Rescue.” This map displayed the names and locations of people needing to be 
rescued, as well as those individuals who had already been rescued.261 Matthew Marchetti 
built another rescue map called “CrowdSource Rescue” after he was turned away from the 
rescue effort by firefighters, and was instructed to go check in at the local fire station if he 
wanted to help.262 However, Marchetti and a couple of other volunteers decided to use 
Facebook to “get involved in the rescue process,” but noted that the number of posts were 
overwhelming and difficult to track.263 In an attempt to resolve this issue and coordinate 
rescue efforts, he developed a simple online mapping program for a handful of OSV 
responders (mostly his friends) to use; however, his “map set the internet ablaze.”264 In 
fact, Marchetti’s crowd sourcing distress map was so useful during Hurricane Harvey that 
professional emergency managers began working with him to figure out a way to leverage 
the platform during future disasters.265 
While OSVs were using social media to receive rescue requests and create 
crowdsourced rescue maps, many traditional emergency management organizations were 
not. This is not to say that official organizations did not embrace social media; however, 
its use was primarily focused on information sharing vice information gathering. The 
Harris County Sheriff’s Office, Houston Office of Emergency Management, and the HPD 
all used social media to provide information and updates to residents affected by 
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Harvey.266 However, these updates were only intended to be received by impacted 
individuals, and no mechanism was in place for two-way communications or information 
gathering. Despite the USCG’s guidance not to report distress via social media, the 
organization knew that trapped individuals were doing so and needed a way to access and 
use this information. However, the USCG does not have a mechanism in place to receive 
distress notifications through social media.  
Observing this challenge, Evan Twarog, a cadet at the Coast Guard Academy in 
New London, CT, who had previously learned of crisis mapping prior to Harvey through 
an independent research project, thought the technology might be useful.267 Twarog 
contacted an organization he had conducted previous research with (Digital Humanitarian 
Network) and was connected with the non-profit Humanity Road, which previously “aided 
in crisis mapping efforts before following natural disasters in Haiti and Nepal.”268 The 
chief operations officer for Humanity Road, Cat Graham, was excited by the opportunity 
stating, “Evan was a groundbreaker in doing this, because the Coast Guard has never done 
this before.”269 Responding to Twarog’s request, Humanity Road solicited the help of 
digital volunteers from around the world. These digital volunteers “sifted through social 
media posts to log data on 1,000 search-and-rescue cases involving 5,200 people.”270 
However, this catalogued data was not very usable. Therefore, Twarog turned to his 
classmate Gabby Auzenbergs who was familiar with geographic information systems 
(GIS) technology from her studies in marine environmental science. Auzenbergs was able 
to take Humanity Road’s data and develop SAR maps that “pinpointed the latitude and 
longitude of each case, and … show [ed] the areas in the most distress.”271 These maps 
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were updated and sent to the Coast Guard District Eight Command Center and Texas Task 
Force One three times each day, and turned out to be quite useful; with some USCG pilots 
“confirm [ing] that they used the maps to find people in need of rescue.”272 One of the 
reasons that Twarog noted this approach was successful was the support of those in his 
chain of command to embrace new ideas and technology.273 
While internal coordination efforts were taking place within the USCG and OSV 
groups, minimal external or cross-organizational coordination efforts occurred between 
official responders and OSVs. John Gallagher, a member of the Cajun Navy noted, “[the 
organization] has several local chapters, and works with similar, loosely-organized groups, 
[however] works independently from government entities like the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, or the local police and fire departments.”274 
Additionally, Ben Husser, a native of Hammond, Louisiana and former member of the Air 
National Guard, who responded during Harvey as a member of the Cajun Navy, recalled 
an evacuation of a nursing home in Port Arthur, TX. Once he and members of the Cajun 
Navy arrived at the nursing home, they found 65 residents trapped in water that was feet 
deep and inundated with raw sewage.275 Husser “demanded to speak to the director of the 
nursing home” and was informed that the Cajun Navy could not evacuate the nursing home 
residents, and that “only the National Guard was authorized to do so.”276 Finding himself 
at an impasse with the nursing home director, Husser called a Louisiana congressman who 
was supportive of the Cajun Navy’s efforts, and after hearing the details of the situation 
stated, “do what you have to do to get [those] people out. We’ll deal with the consequences 
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director, while the Cajun Navy evacuated the nursing home residents. During an interview 
after this incident, Hauser noted that he has responded to dozens of storms, as both a 
member of the Air National Guard and as a concerned citizen with an OSV group. 
However, he also noted that he prefers the OSVs because he can get more accomplished 
by not being “bound by a set of rules” like he was in the military.278 
Chris Fiore, an emergency medical technician noted additional examples of the lack 
of cross-organizational coordination. He responded as part of an OSV group during Harvey 
and according to his account during the first few days after landfall, law enforcement 
personnel were routinely turning away volunteer SAR organizations, but seemed to lack a 
good reason for denying their assistance.279 Another member of an OSV group stated that 
some local police and fire personnel wanted help and would allow OSVs to proceed one 
day only to turn them away the next.280 While the general theme was that official 
organizations were reluctant to accept OSV assistance, there were a few documented 
instances of local emergency responders reaching out to OSVs for help. The HPD sent out 
a tweet asking anyone with a boat who could help to call the department and provided a 
phone number, and other local emergency responders sent out requests for help on social 
media asking for individuals with boats or high-water vehicles to contact fire officials.281 
d. SAR Operations 
The final SAR task is SAR operations, and during Hurricane Harvey, both the 
USCG and OSVs conducted operations by carrying out non-regular tasks with the 
assistance of digital technology. OSV groups themselves emerged with the help of social 
media, and used digital technology applications to facilitate their SAR response operations. 
At least three OSV groups conducted operations under the name Cajun Navy during 
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Hurricane Harvey. These groups were comprised of individuals from the original 
organization that emerged during Hurricane Katrina, and the later variants that emerged 
during the Louisiana floods in 2016. Additionally, numerous OSVs emerged during 
Harvey, inspired by the efforts of the Cajun Navy, including the Cajun Army (for people 
without boats), the Cajun Special Forces, the Cajun Green Cross, as well as the Texas Navy 
in Houston.282 These OSVs leveraged digital technologies, such as social media, to 
connect with each other and to conduct SAR operations, and one of these digital technology 
applications was Zello, which was downloaded by six million people the week after Harvey 
hit and jumped its total registered user base to over 100 million.283 
The Zello application essentially turns a cellphone into a citizens band (CB) radio, 
which was used by OSVs to report their positions, while other OSVs directed them to areas 
where they were needed, and verified that evacuations had been conducted successfully.284 
In fact, the Zello application was so widely adopted that eventually multiple channels were 
created based on the area of operations across the city. OSV rescuer Charles Garfinkel 
noted that he used Zello to coordinate rescues, and “was amazed at the fact that [they] were 
able to do this and didn’t have to go through a FEMA coordinator or anything.”285 FEMA 
Administrator, Brock Long, while not recognizing OSV efforts directly noted, “[FEMA] 
consistently advocate [s] for a culture of preparedness and a less-bureaucratic system of 
disaster response and recovery.”286 The CEO of Zello, Bill Moore, said “the company… 
[was] proud to be part of the rescue efforts.”287 Zello is a Texas-based company out of 
Austin that has been around since 2012 and had been used during previous disasters. The 
Cajun Navy began using Zello to coordinate SAR response operations in 2016 during 
 
282 Markowitz, “We’ll Deal with the Consequences Later.” 
283 Markowitz. 
284 Bailey, “#SOSHouston: How Apps and Social Media Assist Harvey Rescue Efforts.” 
285 Bailey. 
286 Pohl, “An App Helped Rescue 37,000 Hurricane Victims.” 
287 Bailey, “#SOSHouston: How Apps and Social Media Assist Harvey Rescue Efforts.” 
76 
flooding that trapped over 20,000 people in Baton Rouge, LA.288 Ever since, OSVs have 
perfected their use of Zello for SAR response operations during disasters.289 
However, this widespread adoption of the Zello application was not without 
controversy. Zello was so successful during Hurricane Harvey that it was advertised on 
national media outlets, and links were posted on social media and Zello’s website 
directly.290 Texas Search and Rescue Planning Section Chief Brandon Goering noted that 
some OSVs were using the TEXSAR official logo on their Zello channels, which gave the 
impression that the organization was coordinating with the OSVs, or was using the Zello 
channel themselves, which caused confusion for people trying to request help. 
Additionally, according to Shawn Hohnstreiter, the Board Chairman and Operations 
Section Chief for TEXSAR, this problem worsened when distress individuals used Zello 
channels to call for help, but were told that they needed to contact 911. Hohnstreiter also 
noted, “[TEXSAR] had received multiple complaints from people that thought these 
spontaneous volunteers were our legitimate organization.”291 
In addition to using the Zello application to coordinate and conduct SAR 
operations, OSVs turned to crowdsourced rescue maps. Nick Terrel, one of the Cajun Navy 
rescuers who responded during Hurricane Harvey noted he spent almost a day driving 
around Houston, checking Facebook, and looking for areas where people needed help, but 
almost every location that he responded to had already been evacuated. Terrel stated, “it 
was very unorganized since it was just based off of social media posts. We didn’t know 
what to do, or where to go, or who to contact to help.”292 However, it did not take long 
before Terrel learned of Marchetti’s “CrowdSource Rescue” map and decided to see if it 
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operations during Harvey, which spurred more than 30,000 rescues by over 8,000 
rescuers.293  
The USCG also conducted SAR operations during Hurricane Harvey by carrying 
out non-traditional tasks aided by digital technologies. The USCG typically does not 
dispatch SAR resources based on a social media post; however, since so many distressed 
individuals were turning to social media for help during Hurricane Harvey, the organization 
had to adapt. Vice Admiral Sandra Stosz, the Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for 
Mission Support at the time noted, “That’s how [the USCG] rescued … 11,000 people, 
leaning in on how the public was self-selecting to use social media, because they couldn’t 
get through on 911 calls.”294 Unlike in previous disasters where USCG rescuers had to 
respond into impacted areas and essentially go door-to-door looking for distressed 
individuals waving their arms or shining flashlights, the USCG took a forward leaning 
posture during Hurricane Harvey and conducted SAR operations by embracing 
new technologies. During Hurricane Harvey, distressed individuals reported their 
situation and location by calling 911 or the USCG directly, or by posting on social media. 
The USCG’s GEOINT team and the USCG Academy (with the help of Humanitarian 
Road) took this information and aggregated it to create distress maps showing the 
areas where distress cases were most prevalent, or in some cases, the geo-coordinates for 
each individual SAR case. These distress maps were then sent to both operational 
commanders and individual SAR units to facilitate SAR response operations. While the 
USCG still lacks policy or procedures for responding to distress calls initiated 
through social media, the organization’s efforts and willingness to embrace new 
technologies in the face of disasters has shown the value that digital technology can play 
in future disaster response operations. 
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The decision of distressed individuals to report their distress via social media vice 
traditional notification methods appears to be increasing during disasters. Additionally, 
during Hurricane Harvey, more OSV groups were identified than in the previous disaster 
case studies, which seem to suggest that the level of OSV involvement is also increasing. 
This would stand to reason as digital technologies have provided distressed individuals 
with an alternative way to communicate during disasters, and by the fact that OSVs are 
now able to leverage evolving digital technologies to self-organize, 
communicate, coordinate, and conduct their civilian-led SAR operations. Additionally, 
spontaneous volunteers’ knowledge of an event’s needs and their capability to get involved 
has increased because digital volunteers can now support the disaster response from outside 
the disaster area itself, which historically limited the convergence of spontaneous 
volunteers to individuals in the immediate proximity to the disaster stricken area.  
The evolution and effectiveness of digital technologies during disaster response 
operations is not exclusive to OSV groups. Official organizations, such as the USCG, also 
realized the value that digital technologies can have during disaster related SAR operations. 
The willingness and adaptability of OSVs and the USCG to embrace new digital 
technologies is one of the successful highlights of this case. However, the lack of cross-
organizational coordination continues to result in a duplication of efforts that created a 
reduced common operational picture for the USCG during Hurricane Harvey. Both OSVs 
and the USCG created distress maps during this event; however, these maps could have 
been more accurate, and possibly more useful, if they accounted for all data sources. The 
USCG created a relatively small crowdsourced distress map (with the aid of Humanity 
Road) that reflected only 1,000 rescues, compared to the “CrowdSourced Rescue” map 
created by OSVs who reflected 30,000 rescues. 
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VI. DISASTER RESEARCH CENTER TYPOLOGY ANALYSIS OF
SAR RESPONSES TO MARITIME CASE STUDIES 
This chapter conducts an analysis of the organizational response of both the USCG 
and OSVs, according to the DRC’s four-fold typology of organized responses to disasters 
(based on task and structure), to identify specific factors of the USCG’s organizational 
response that affected OSV engagement. This DRC typology analysis was conducted by 
examining each SAR task identified in the previous chapter to determine if it was a regular 
or non-regular task for the organization carrying it out, and to determine if the 
organizational structures used to carry out each SAR task were in place prior to the disaster, 
or if they were created as a result of the disaster itself. Ultimately, this DRC typology 
analysis led to a typology identification for each organization, according to the DRC 
typology of organized responses to disasters, which highlighted certain USCG 
organizational responses more conducive than others for engaging OSVs. This 
chapter concludes with a cross-case analysis to note overall trends and patterns between 
each case study to generalize commonalities and draw conclusions.  
A. DRC TYPOLOGY ANALYSIS OF LOWER MANHATTAN BOAT LIFT
ON 9/11
During the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11, both the USCG and OSVs carried
out maritime SAR tasks, and many of these tasks were non-regular tasks for both 
organizations. A clear and substantial blending of organizational structures also occurred 
between the USCG and OSVs, which was used to carry out each SAR task.  
Both organizations carried out the first SAR task of distress monitoring and 
communication independently. The USCG acted independently when receiving the first 
distress call via VHF-FM radio transmission, but stopped short however of issuing a UMIB 
to solicit the assistance of other vessels in the area; instead, it chose to dispatch a single 
vessel (to assess the situation) and to work on notifying the appropriate department. The 
USCG did not initially recognize the event as a disaster that would require maritime SAR 
most likely because of the nature of the initial distress call. However, even if the USCG 
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recognized the event as a pending evacuation of lower Manhattan, distress monitoring for 
evacuations on land is not a regular task for the USCG.  
OSVs near Battery Park also acted independently to learn of the distress through a 
process known as distributive sense-making, which was a non-regular task for most if not 
all the vessel operators in the area. Once these vessel operators were aware of the distress, 
they decided to start the evacuation efforts themselves even before the USCG could fully 
grasp the situation at hand. 
The SAR tasks of search planning and preparedness and SAR coordination were 
also non-regular tasks for both organizations. Neither the USCG nor the OSVs had a plan 
for how to evacuate lower Manhattan, or a plan for how to coordinate an evacuation effort 
using the makeshift flotilla of vessels. As such, a plan needed to be developed on the spot. 
While the USCG did have plans, such as OpSail and a mass rescue plan for a capsized 
Staten Island ferry, neither of these plans addressed all aspects of the evolution unfolding. 
Instead, a decision was made to use the pilot boat New York as a joint floating command 
post. While a deviation from normal USCG or harbor pilot coordination efforts, it served 
to establish a focal point where mariners could look to identify the new developing rules 
of the harbor. 
Due to the non-regular SAR tasks needed to conduct an evacuation of lower 
Manhattan, the USCG was not able to respond to the event as an established organization, 
and at the very least, would have needed to respond as an extending organization. However, 
USCG Lieutenant Mike Day and Sandy Hook harbor pilot Andrew McGovern began 
collaborating on what needed to be done and how to do it. This collaboration shifted the 
USCG from an extending group to an emergent group because now both the tasks and the 
structures used to carry out those tasks were new. This new organizational structure 
consisting of the USCG and harbor pilots decided to put out a radio broadcast for all 
available boats to assist in the evacuation. While this broadcast aimed to solicit help from 
mariners in the area like a UMIB, it was substantially different in the fact that it came from 
the pilot boat New York vice the USCG command center on Staten Island, and it provided 
specific instructions on where to go to assist, i.e., report to Governors Island. The overall 
decision to use the pilot boat New York as a floating command post, and the subsequent 
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radio broadcast for all available boats, was the initial formation of the emergent 
organizational structure used to conduct SAR operations throughout the remainder of the 
event. 
The final SAR task of SAR operations was also a non-regular task for both 
organizations independently, as well as for the newly formed joint organization. Neither 
the USCG nor the harbor pilots routinely conduct evacuations on land, and conducting an 
evacuation of any kind is definitely a non-regular task for the OSVs involved in the event. 
However, maritime SAR operations were carried out by over 150 USCG and OSV vessels. 
This effort was similar to the systems approach of SAR operations that the USCG routinely 
uses, however, in lieu of USCG vessels and aircraft, SAR operations were conducted 
primarily by OSVs using various ferries and tug boats. Notably, the USCG was not 
directing which vessels should go where, but was relying on the judgment and experience 
of the harbor pilots at Governors Island to assess the various capabilities of the vessels and 
direct them where they could best be used. 
The organizational structure, consisting of representatives from the USCG and 
OSVs, which was used to carry out maritime SAR tasks during the Lower Manhattan Boat 
Lift was a new structure that developed as a result of the disaster itself, and this new 
structure was used to carry out non-regular SAR tasks. If these dimensions of structure and 
task are analyzed according to the DRC typology of organized responses to disasters, it is 
clear that an emergent group was present as depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2. USCG and OSV DRC Typology Placement during 9/11 Boat Lift 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
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B. DRC TYPOLOGY ANALYSIS OF HURRICANE KATRINA  
If we would have had to wait for the federal government to be down here to 
help people, you know how many people would have died?295  
—Former Louisiana Senator Nick Gautreaux 
During Hurricane Katrina, both the USCG and OSVs carried out maritime SAR 
tasks. Many of these tasks were non-regular for the USCG, and every task was new for the 
OSVs who responded. However, unlike the previous case study, during Katarina, a 
blending of organizational structures did not occur between the USCG and OSVs. 
Additionally, any substantial coordination efforts did not occur between the USCG and 
OSVs at the organizational level.  
Both the USCG and OSVs carried out the first SAR task of distress monitoring and 
communication independently, and it is important to note that this task was a non-regular 
task for both organizations. Distress monitoring started out as a regular task for the USCG, 
in the form of hurricane preparations and staging of personnel and equipment just outside 
the area of impact. However, once it was safe to initiate operations in New Orleans, USCG 
responders discovered that local emergency management officials had no way to 
communicate, coordinate, or direct federal response assets, which resulted in USCG 
aircraft independently flying over flooded areas physically looking for individuals in 
distress. Additionally, USCG boat crews responded by going house-to-house knocking on 
windows and attics looking for survivors. This task was non-regular for the USCG because 
the organization does not normally go door-to-door looking for individuals in distress, but 
rather is notified of a particular distress situation and probable location prior to launching 
assets.  
OSVs during Katrina also conducted distress monitoring and communication as a 
non-regular task. Former Senator Nick Gautreaux, who notified OSVs of a distress 
situation in which they could help, was a non-regular task by itself. Typically, elected 
officials do not request OSVs to implement SAR operations, and even when or if their 
assistance is request, it is not requested in such a general and ad hoc way. While the USCG 
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does solicit spontaneous volunteer assistance during SAR cases in the form of issuing an 
UMIB, this broadcast is fundamentally different because it is confined to a specific 
geographic area, the USCG coordinates all aspects of the SAR response, and the USCG 
has direct communications and information flow (via a standard maritime radio) with the 
volunteers who respond. Whereas, the OSVs who responded to Gautreaux’s request for 
help, showed up without a clear plan, objective, or way to communicate or coordinate with 
other responders.  
Rather than augment official response efforts (like a UMIB is designed to do), the 
non-specific media broadcasts for help resulted in a mass convergence of spontaneous 
volunteers to the disaster area, which ultimately led to the emergence of an organized group 
that became known as the Cajun Navy. Regardless of the non-regular nature of the request 
for spontaneous volunteers, once the Cajun Navy arrived in the city, they were met with 
the same challenges as USCG boat crews, and also resorted to going house-to-house 
looking for survivors.  
For the USCG, search planning and preparedness during Katrina was a regular task 
conducted any time a hurricane is forecasted to make landfall in the United States. The 
Coast Guard conducts planning and preparedness exercises before each hurricane season, 
and uses its existing structure to mobilize assets and personnel from around the country to 
conduct a SAR response when disaster strikes. In contrast, the OSVs who responded during 
Katrina did not conduct any SAR planning or preparedness activities, because the 
organization only came into existence as a direct result of the disaster itself. 
During Hurricane Katrina, SAR coordination was lacking both internally between 
government responders themselves and externally with OSVs. The lack of internal 
government coordination was noted by the establishment of two separate SAR command 
centers being established in New Orleans alone (DOD and USCG), and the lack of 
coordination efforts between the USCG and FEMA US&R task forces. This lack of 
coordination most likely resulted because roles and responsibilities for SAR during 
disasters were not clearly defined in the NRP or the National SAR Plan. Additionally, 
US&R task forces were activated to conduct SAR operations for which at the time they 
were not trained or equipped to handle.  
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It is clear that FEMA recognized this issue in retrospect, because the NRP was 
replaced by the NRF and the National SAR Plan was updated to establish the USCG as an 
essential component of the federal government’s response to disasters; and more 
specifically, as the primary agency for maritime/coastal/waterborne SAR.  
The lack of coordination with OSVs was also noted by reports of official responders 
denying OSVs access to the disaster area, and attempting to turn them around by claiming 
that it was too dangerous or that they were not needed. While the USCG did have a few 
instances of SAR coordination efforts with local officials, no evidence was found of the 
USCG coordinating directly with OSVs at an organizational level. Instead, the USCG 
attempted to coordinate with local officials because the National SAR Plan maintains that 
state and local authorities should normally retain SAR responsibilities during incidents, 
and as a federal asset under the NRP, the USCG’s deployment was to support state and 
local officials. However, state and local officials were overwhelmed and could not support 
USCG coordination efforts, much less address OSV coordination. Additionally, it is 
important to note that neither the NRP nor the National SAR Plan fully address the fact 
that the USCG has a statutory authority and responsibility to conduct SAR, regardless of a 
disaster declaration or NRP implementation. Based on this situation, the USCG could have 
initiated coordination efforts directly with OSVs, but because spontaneous volunteers 
during disasters were not well understood, it instead chose to focus on internal SAR 
coordination efforts and independent USCG SAR operations.  
Both the USCG and OSVs carried out the final task of SAR operations. The 
USCG’s culture of on-scene initiative allowed it to succeed in this area during Katrina. 
Examples can be seen in the decision of a C-130 pilot to abandon her assigned mission of 
conducting an environmental overflight to establish a communications platform for SAR 
operations, Air Station New Orleans personnel gaining access to the Navy’s fuel supply, 
USCG boat crews piloting their vessels through flooded streets looking for survivors, and 
USCG aircrews conducting non-traditional hoists from rooftops and rescuing people from 
inside trapped attics.  
This innovation was possible because despite the communication, and command 
and control challenges presented during Katrina, Coast Guard personnel were not reliant 
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on a top-down command and control structure, and were allowed a certain amount of 
flexibility to act independently or with limited guidance from commanding officers. 
Overall, the USCG responded to Katrina using existing structures; however, numerous 
non-regular tasks were undertaken. If these dimensions of structure and task are analyzed 
according to the DRC typology of organized responses to disasters, it is clear that the 
USCG responded to Katrina as an extending group (Table 3) by using existing structures 
to carry out non-regular tasks.  
Table 3. USCG DRC Typology Placement during Hurricane Katrina 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
 
In contrast, OSVs who responded during Katrina carried out SAR tasks as new or 
non-regular tasks for their organizations and since the group did not exist prior to the event, 
the organizational structures used to carry out these tasks had to be created, which made 
OSVs an emergent group during Hurricane Katrina (Table 4).  
Table 4. OSV DRC Typology Placement during Hurricane Katrina 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
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C. DRC TYPOLOGY ANALYSIS OF HURRICANE HARVEY 
During Hurricane Harvey, both the USCG and OSVs carried out maritime SAR 
tasks, and similar to the previous case studies, many of these SAR tasks were non-regular 
tasks for both organizations. However, unlike in the previous case studies, during 
Hurricane Harvey, both the USCG and OSVs leveraged digital technologies to conduct 
SAR tasks, which often necessitated modifications to their organizational structures to 
carry out. However, it is important to note that these organizational structure changes were 
primarily limited to internal structural changes or coordination efforts and very little 
evidence exists that any external or cross-organizational coordination occurred. 
Both the USCG and OSVs carried out the first SAR task of distress monitoring and 
communication independently. However, after distressed individuals turned to social 
media for help when they were not able to contact traditional emergency services, this SAR 
task quickly became a non-regular task for both organizations. The USCG responded by 
attempting to redirect individuals from reporting distress via social media, and sent out 
several messages instructing people to call 911 or to contact the USCG directly for help. 
Redirecting the public away from a self-selected distress notification method was a non-
regular task for the USCG by itself, and the establishment of a special triage unit in 
Washington, DC (to handle the high volume of calls the USCG was receiving) was not 
only a non-regular task, but also required the establishment of new organizational 
structures to achieve. The USCG’s National Command Center is not typically involved in 
SAR case prosecution, as USCG SAR missions are typically coordinated and controlled at 
the sector or district level in the organization in alignment with internationally recognized 
SRRs. 
In contrast, OSV groups took a more proactive approach to embracing social media 
as a distress notification method. OSVs took on the role of digital volunteers by tracking 
and cataloging distress calls initiated through social media (based on their hashtags), and 
started relaying these calls in Houston’s 911 centers. However, it is important to note that 
while digital volunteers were attempting to help, in reality, they were adding to the volume 
of calls that had already overwhelmed the emergency communications network because 
social media posts are widely shared, and often resulted in multiple 911 calls for the same 
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incident. Additionally, many OSVs decided to respond directly to social media posts for 
help by initiating their own independent SAR operations. It was a non-regular task for 
OSVs, because it was one of the first instances where distressed individuals could contact 
OSVs directly and completely circumvent traditional distress monitoring and notification 
pathways. 
The second SAR task of search planning and preparedness was a regular task for 
the USCG and conducted any time a hurricane is forecasted to make landfall in the United 
States. The Coast Guard conducts planning and preparedness exercises before each 
hurricane season, and uses its existing structure to mobilize assets and SAR response 
personnel from around the country to conduct operations whenever disaster strikes. In 
contrast, the OSVs who responded during Hurricane Harvey did not conduct any SAR 
planning or preparedness activities, because the organization did not emerge until the 
response phase of the disaster itself. It is important to note that OSVs operating under the 
Cajun Navy name were active in 2016 (supporting flood response operations in New 
Orleans), and could have potentially undertaken some planning or preparedness activities 
prior to Hurricane Harvey. However, OSVs are continually modifying their organizational 
structures based on the ever-changing convergence of spontaneous volunteers present 
during each disaster. As such, any search planning and preparedness activities would be 
difficult if not impossible for OSVs, prior to the actual disaster itself.  
During Hurricane Harvey, a substantial amount of SAR coordination also took 
place, and digital technologies helped to facilitate this coordination. However, coordination 
for the most part was confined to either official internal government coordination efforts, 
or internal coordination efforts amongst OSV groups. Very limited external or cross-
organizational coordination efforts occurred between official responders and OSVs. OSV 
groups coordinated amongst themselves and with each other through digital media 
platforms by collecting distress notification data from social media and using it to create 
crowdsourced rescue maps. These maps were then widely shared amongst various other 
OSV groups conducting independent SAR operations to include the Cajun Navy and Texas 
Navy. Additionally, OSV groups embraced digital technologies to coordinate and 
communicate with each other by establishing a common communications platform. While 
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OSVs would typically not have a common communications platform like an official 
organization does, OSVs during Harvey adapted and embraced the Zello application to 
establish various communication channels to conduct their SAR operations.  
Comparatively, the USCG’s internal coordination efforts primarily focused on 
collecting and aggregating distress notifications, which was also a non-regular SAR task 
that required the establishment of new organizational structures. The USCG’s National 
Command Center, Coast Guard GEOINT team, and USCG Academy all became 
components of the SAR response system, and were leveraged to aggregate distress calls 
directly to the USCG and sort and catalogue distress notifications initiated through social 
media platforms. Once these distress notifications were collected, categorized, and 
aggregated, they were used to make resource allocation decisions and produce distress 
maps for USCG SAR resources. However, an argument can be made that the OSV created 
distress or rescue maps were far superior to the USCG’s distress or rescue maps, based on 
the higher number of recorded rescues identified in the OSV’s version. 
Both the USCG and OSVs conducted the final SAR task of SAR operations during 
Hurricane Harvey, and included non-regular tasks for both organizations. The emergence 
of OSV groups themselves was a non-regular task, because unlike in the previous case 
studies, OSVs used digital technologies to converge as digital volunteers. However, this 
convergence led to the emergence of OSVs groups that carried out additional SAR 
functions rather than just physically responding in shallow water vessels to conduct SAR 
responses (as was seen in the Hurricane Katrina case study). Hurricane Harvey was one of 
the first instances where OSVs did not have to be physically present in the disaster response 
area to get involved in the rescue efforts. Tech savvy OSVs were now able to build 
crowdsourced rescue maps or operate much like an official dispatcher through the Zello 
application to direct OSV resources to where they were needed from anywhere in the 
world. In comparison, the USCG also conducted SAR operations during Hurricane Harvey 
by carrying out non-traditional tasks aided by digital technologies. The USCG typically 
does not dispatch SAR resources based on a social media post; however, because so many 
distressed individuals were turning to social media for help, the organization had to adapt. 
The USCG adapted by leveraging other components of the organization typically external 
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to the SAR system to develop distress maps in addition to the crowdsourced rescue maps 
created by OSVs.  
Overall, the USCG responded to Hurricane Harvey by modifying its traditional 
SAR response structures and conducted non-regular tasks aided by advances in digital 
technology. If these dimensions of structure and task are analyzed according to the DRC 
typology of organized responses to disasters, it is clear that the USCG responded to Harvey 
as an emergent group by itself, even without developing organizational structures that 
included OSVs (Table 5).  
Table 5. USCG DRC Typology Placement during Hurricane Harvey 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
 
In comparison, OSVs responded during Harvey by developing their own 
organizational structures and determining how they wanted to use those structures to carry 
out individual SAR tasks during the disaster response. Based on the creation of new 
structures and the use of these structures to carry out non-regular SAR tasks, OSV groups 
also responded to Hurricane Harvey as an emergent group (Table 6). 
Table 6. OSV DRC Typology Placement during Hurricane Harvey 
 Tasks 
Structures Regular Non-regular 
Existing Established Extending 
New Expanding Emergent 
 
90 
D. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS OF MARITIME CASE STUDIES 
When the organizational response of both the USCG and OSVs is analyzed across 
all three case studies, several trends and patterns emerge. First, neither organization was 
able to respond to any of the disasters and perform maritime SAR functions as an 
established organization. This result makes sense for OSV groups that do not conduct SAR 
tasks daily, and where any SAR tasks undertaken are by default non-regular tasks for the 
group. Additionally, OSV groups emerged as a direct result of the disasters themselves, 
which required their organizational structures to be developed on the spot, and according 
to the needs of each event. However, the fact that the USCG was not able to respond as an 
established organization to perform SAR tasks, which the organization conducts daily, 
during disaster response operations, was quite interesting.  
In all three case studies, the USCG had to take on non-regular tasks to carry out 
traditional SAR functions. It is also important to note that the USCG took on new or non-
regular tasks to carry out three of the four SAR tasks routinely carried out by the USCG 
during SAR missions, with the exception of search planning and preparedness, which the 
USCG conducted as a regular task prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey. Furthermore, 
in two of the three cases studied, the USCG had to develop new organizational structures 
to carry out these non-regular tasks. According to the DRC typology of organized 
responses to disasters, if an organization takes on non-regular tasks and develops new 
organizational structures to carry out those tasks, it is then considered an emergent group. 
This finding is consistent with those of this research that identified the USCG as an 
emergent group during both the Lower Manhattan Boat Lift on 9/11 and Hurricane Harvey. 
However, what is unique is why the USCG became an emergent group during the Lower 
Manhattan Boat Lift, by developing organizational structures external to the USCG and 
included OSVs, whereas during Hurricane Harvey, the USCG became an emergent group 
by developing organizational structures internal to the USCG and did not included OSVs. 
A probable explanation points to the rapid change and development of the U.S. disaster 
response system and the implementation of NIMS and the NRF.  
During 9/11, the USCG did not respond as part of a national response strategy and 
instead responded as an independent SAR organization that had the flexibility to respond 
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in a more decentralized manner, with the ability to adapt to the situation at hand, and to 
carry out SAR tasks however necessary. Additionally, as previously noted, a decentralized 
command and control model is well suited for disaster operations of limited scale and 
duration, which explains the success of the decentralized and emergent group response 
(consisting of both the USCG and OSVs) during the lower Manhattan Boat Lift, as the 
entire operation only took nine hours. In contrast, the USCG responded to Hurricane 
Harvey as part of NIMS, which was implemented after 9/11, and defines the roles and 
structures for federal, state, and local response agencies during nationally declared 
disasters. As part of NIMS, the USCG responded to Hurricane Harvey not as an 
independent SAR organization, but as a FEMA designated primary federal agency to 
support state and local agencies by coordinating maritime SAR operations.  
However, the USCG is still adapting to the role of primary federal agency during 
presidentially declared disasters, because neither the NRF nor the National SAR Plan fully 
address how the USCG is supposed to respond in support of state and local agencies, and 
yet still fulfill its statutory requirements to conduct SAR missions by performing any and 
all acts necessary to rescue or aid persons in distress upon the high seas or imperiled by 
flood waters. Evidence can be seen in the USCG’s response to Hurricane Katrina, because 
the USCG reverted back to an independent SAR organization when the national response 
strategy was not working. The USCG’s decision to revert back to a decentralized SAR 
organization also accounts for why the USCG was viewed as one of the only success stories 
of the federal response to Katrina. Thus, this begs the question that if the USCG responds 
better to disasters that require maritime SAR by performing any and all acts necessary to 
rescue persons in distress, then why did the USCG not explore the use of OSVs during 
Hurricanes Katarina and Harvey?296 To answer this question, a better understanding of 
what can be done to improve OSV engagement during future hurricane response operations 
is needed.  
  
 
296 Performing any and all acts necessary to rescue persons in distress during disasters most certainly 
includes the use of OSVs, and is not unlike the USCG’s UMIBs to solicit spontaneous volunteer assistance 
during steady state SAR operations.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter revisits the overall research question of how can the USCG better 
engage organized spontaneous volunteers who conduct maritime SAR during hurricane 
response operations. It draws conclusions based on the case study analyses, and offers 
recommendations for ways to increase cross-organizational engagement between official 
response organizations and OSVs. Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing areas that 
may benefit from additional research.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the case studies found that the USCG is not able to respond 
effectively as an existing group to carry out SAR tasks during maritime disasters. At a 
minimum, the USCG either will need to conduct new or non-regular tasks or will need to 
create new structures to carry out new or non-regular tasks. Additionally, OSVs are an 
inevitable part of disaster response, and if appropriately leveraged, they can add value to 
an already strained disaster response system. The challenge is finding ways to integrate 
OSVs effectively into disaster response operations. The USCG can better engage OSVs 
who conduct maritime SAR during hurricane response operations by seeking out 
innovative and new ways to respond to disasters organizationally, with the goal of 
becoming an emergent group itself. As an emergent group, new organizational structures 
would be developed that include OSVs to carry out new or non-regular tasks as part of the 
emergent group transition process. While the notion of developing new organizational 
structures that include OSVs during hurricane response operations seems simple, in reality, 
several barriers must be overcome. The following section discusses some of these barriers 
and offers recommendations for navigating around them.  
B. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first barrier is how the USCG responds to disasters as part of a national 
response strategy using NIMS. This system relies on ICS to define roles and structures for 
responding organizations, which recent disaster research studies have indicated is not the 
most effective way to respond to disasters. Disasters by their very nature are unpredictable 
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and tend to overwhelm traditional emergency response functions, often requiring official 
response organizations either to take on new roles or to develop new organizational 
structures to respond effectively. While the rational is that pre-defined roles and a common 
organizational structure provide organization amongst various responders during dynamic 
and chaotic events, the use of ICS is one of the major inhibitors of organized spontaneous 
volunteer engagement. By their very nature, OSV groups have a flat organizational 
structure and a decentralized command and control process. Attempting to force OSVs to 
yield to ICS, when they inevitably respond during disasters, sets their involvement in the 
event up for failure from the very beginning. Additionally, one of the primary benefits of 
OSVs is their innate ability to innovate, rapidly shift tasks, and develop highly adaptive 
networks. These qualities are the true value of OSVs during disaster response operations, 
and official response organizations should work to develop strategies for incorporating 
OSVs outside of typical ICS structures. 
Another barrier that specifically limits the USCG from better incorporating OSVs 
during hurricane response operations is the ambiguity of the USCG’s role during disasters 
that require maritime SAR operations in support of a national response strategy. The USCG 
conducts independent SAR operations on a daily basis. However, during presidentially 
declared disasters, it responds as a FEMA designated primary federal agency under the 
NRF and the National SAR Plan. Neither of these plans fully addresses the USCG’s 
responsibility to support state and local agencies during disasters, yet still fulfill its 
statutory requirements to conduct SAR missions as an independent SAR organization. The 
USCG’s ability to conduct any and all tasks necessary to prevent the loss of life during 
maritime SAR operations is one of the greatest values of the organization, and its ability to 
adapt and employ a decentralized command and control process, whenever necessary, 
should be leveraged to its fullest extent during maritime disasters. 
Finally, the natural evolution of digital technologies, and the widespread adoption 
and use of social media is affecting how individuals communicate during disasters. 
Distressed individuals turning to social media for help is a new complexity that official 
response organizations need to address. Specifically, the USCG should work to develop 
policies and procedures for officially receiving distress notifications through social media 
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for both routine and disaster related operations, and should work to develop consistent 
mechanisms to collect and aggregate social media data effectively. The USCG could 
potentially leverage OSVs in this one area because they have already demonstrated the 
capability and capacity to add value to the overall disaster response by collecting and 
aggregating crowdsourced SAR data to create rescue maps.  
C. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
While this research has noted that the organizational response of official 
organizations does affect spontaneous volunteer engagement, and has offered 
recommendations for how official organizations can alter their organizational structures to 
better incorporate OSV groups during disaster response operations, the overall topic of 
emergent spontaneous volunteerism is still highly complex and additional research needs 
to be conducted.  
Future studies should be conducted on the application and use of ICS during 
disaster response operations that involved OSVs, since its nationwide adoption post-9/11. 
These studies should focus on the roles and structures for all responding organizations, 
according to the same DRC typology analysis of organized responses to disasters 
conducted in this study, to determine if ICS inhibited the development of new 
organizational structures or emergence during disasters when it would have been beneficial 
to the overall disaster response. Further research should also be conducted on OSVs who 
develop in the response or recovery stage of a disaster and carried out support functions, 
such as sheltering and caring for victims, food, and supply distribution, donation 
management, and counseling services, to inquire if the similar patterns and trends emerge. 
To understand the USCG’s role better during disasters that require maritime SAR, 
a comprehensive review of national response strategies should be conducted with a focus 
on ESF #9 of the NRF and the National SAR Plan. Specifically, this review should look at 
the USCG’s roles and responsibilities during nationally declared disasters, and how these 
national response strategies impact the organization’s statutory mandates to conduct SAR 
operations. The goal of this comprehensive policy review should be focused on identifying 
96 
gaps, and creating new policy and doctrine that offers more precise and comprehensive 
role clarity for the USCG during nationally declared disasters. 
Future research also needs to be conducted on spontaneous volunteer motivations, 
and ways in which social media may impact a spontaneous volunteer’s decision to get 
involved in disaster response operations or not. While research regarding spontaneous 
volunteer motivations is limited, a better understanding of the motivations behind 
spontaneous volunteerism, and how digital communication technologies are affecting the 
way individuals become aware of particular disaster needs, and decide to become involved 
or not, may offer a measured understanding of the inflection point in which spontaneous 
volunteers are likely to emerge during disasters. This knowledge could help official 
organizations prepare to alter their organizational structures to include OSVs as quickly 
and efficiently as possible.  
Lastly, research should be conducted on the privacy, safety, and legal concerns 
surrounding the use of OSVs during maritime SAR operations, which were beyond the 
scope of this research project.  
D. SUMMARY  
The USCG is not able to respond effectively as an existing group to carry out SAR 
tasks during maritime disasters, and needs to either conduct new or non-regular tasks or 
create new structures to carry out new or non-regular tasks. If the USCG desires to engage 
OSVs who conduct maritime SAR more effectively, during future hurricane response 
operations, then innovative and new ways to incorporate OSVs into new organizational 
structures need to be developed. However, several barriers need to be overcome:  
• First, the USCG responds to disasters as part of a national response 
strategy using NIMS. This system relies on ICS to define roles and 
structures for responding organizations. The use of ICS is one of the major 
inhibitors of organized spontaneous volunteer engagement, and future 
studies should be conducted on the application and use of ICS during 
disaster response operations to develop strategies for incorporating OSVs 
outside of typical ICS structures. 
97 
• Another barrier is the ambiguity of the USCG’s role during disasters that 
require maritime SAR operations in support of a national response 
strategy. To understand the USCG’s role better during disasters that 
require maritime SAR, a comprehensive review of national response 
strategies should be conducted. This review should focus on addressing 
the USCG’s role to support state and local agencies during disasters, yet 
still fulfill its statutory requirements to conduct SAR missions as an 
independent SAR organization. 
• Finally, the natural evolution of digital technologies, and the widespread 
adoption and use of social media is affecting how individuals 
communicate during disasters. The USCG should work to develop policies 
and procedures for officially receiving distress notifications through social 
media, for both routine and disaster related operations, and should work to 
develop consistent mechanisms to collect and aggregate social media data 
effectively to create crowdsourced rescue maps during disasters. 
Responding to major hurricanes can challenge official response organizations. 
However, properly engaging and leveraging OSVs can provide a beneficial surge capacity 
if done properly. As the lead federal maritime SAR agency, the USCG can and should work 
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APPENDIX. U.S. DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEM BACKGROUND, 
EVOLUTION, AND CHALLENGES 
“Throughout history, frustration with current policies has often led to changes in 
disaster management.”297 In fact, FEMA was created to address the fragmentation across 
various disaster response agencies.298  
It is important to understand how the established disaster response system in the 
United States developed, functions today, and addresses volunteerism overall. This 
appendix is broken down into several sections that define disasters, identify key events in 
U.S. disaster management history (highlighting subsequent policy shifts), and discuss how 
the current disaster management system in the United States addresses volunteerism. 
Lastly, this appendix concludes by discussing how ICS may not be the best system for 
community-wide disasters where spontaneous volunteers are part of the disaster response.  
A. WHAT IS A DISASTER?  
Disaster researchers can use a common functionalist or systems prospective to 
conceptualize disasters. Disasters are extreme events that impact communities in ways that 
exceed their capacity to prevent adverse effects. Simply put, disasters happen when 
community response needs outpace capabilities.299  
The response needs to a small-scale, slow-moving disaster may be just below the 
threshold where local communities can respond without the need for outside assistance. 
However, large-scale, rapid-onset disasters require assistance from larger outside entities, 
such as governmental organizations, as well as public and private assistance to “minimize 
damage and disruption and restore the community to routine functioning.”300 Additionally, 
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it is important to note that responding to disasters often requires organizations to adapt to 
be effective.301 
B. ORIGINS OF “COMMAND AND CONTROL” 
“Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local 
governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role,” however, over time, 
that role has evolved.302 One of the first instances of disaster intervention by the federal 
government occurred in 1803, when a fire destroyed the city of Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.303 From that point until 1950, the federal government provided sporadic aid, 
“in an ad hoc manner without an established Federal role or coordinated response plan.”304 
Not until the Civil Defense Act of 1950 did the United States receive some form of federal 
disaster relief legislation to codify the federal government’s role in disaster response.305 
The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) was also created under the Civil 
Defense Act and followed a military organization structure. This original structuring has 
had long-lasting effects for the disaster response system ever since.306 The underlying 
assumption was that disasters were viewed as the enemy to be defeated, and disaster 
response was organized around the military doctrine of command and control. The concept 
behind this viewpoint was, “disasters cause ‘chaos’ and that ‘command’ and ‘control’ are 
the means to reduce the situation to regular proportions.”307 
Official responders in the disaster response system are typically paramilitary 
emergency response personnel, such as police, fire, and emergency medical services. These 
organizations are considered paramilitary because they function according to a military 
style of command structure, with a top-down hierarchy. Since these paramilitary groups 
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are structured this way, it makes sense that they would find the command and control model 
as the most suitable model for disaster response operations. It also stands to reason that 
because spontaneous volunteer groups do not follow a top-down command and control 
structure, and often have a flat hierarchy, that government responders would assume they 
are unable to cope with disaster situations adequately.308  
C. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 AND THE NATIONAL INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
In response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the federal government took steps to 
alter how it responded to national emergencies and created a comprehensive NIMS. This 
system was designed to:  
Provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local 
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, 
or complexity.309  
NIMS is essentially a national command and control system that defines roles and 
responsibilities for responders at all levels of government. It was designed to be “flexible 
and scalable,” with the concept being that the same disaster management system can be 
used by emergency responders whether they are responding to a single motor vehicle 
accident or a large-scale natural disaster.310 NIMS is mandated for use by all federal 
agencies, and while not specifically mandated for state and local agencies, it is connected 
to federal preparedness grants and other disaster response funding.311 To take advantage 
of federal funding, and federal training opportunities, many state and local agencies have 
adopted NIMS. FEMA oversees the NIMS program, and “manages periodic updates to the 
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doctrine, coordinates with partner agencies on implementation, and manages training 
courses for federal, state, and local responders.”312 
NIMS also mandated ICS as, “a standardized approach to the command, control, 
and coordination of on-scene incident management that provides a common hierarchy 
within which personnel from multiple organizations can be effective.”313 ICS is designed 
to be used by all levels of government, as well as the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and “specifies an organizational structure for incident 
management.”314 This system is designed to be expandable and flexible to adjust to any 
incident, up to, and including major disasters. This structure can grow by implementing 
various aspects of the incident command, command staff, and general staff to meet the 
evolving need of the incident. Figure 4 illustrates the basic ICS structure. 
 
312 Thornburg, 10. 
313 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 24. 
314 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 24. 
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Figure 4. Standard ICS Structure.315 
D. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE NATIONAL RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK 
NIMS and ICS got their first real test during Hurricane Katrina. However, the after 
action analysis of the federal government’s response to Katrina highlighted management 
failures at all levels of government.316 DHS, and in particular FEMA, was reported to be 
inflexible, slow to react to changing conditions, and lacked redundancy.317 Furthermore, 
when traditional command and control channels were interrupted, individual components 
were not able to adapt and self-deploy.318 It is important to note that a single component 
of DHS was exempt from criticism due to its forward leaning posture. The USCG did not 
 
315 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 25. 
316 Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. 
317 Townsend; Bonabeau and Stephenson, “Expecting the Unexpected,” 1. 
318 Bonabeau and Stephenson, 1. 
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wait for authorization to begin SAR operations and according to the GAO, it was based on 
the Coast Guard’s principles to “enable personnel to take responsibility and action.”319 
In response to Katrina, the federal government passed the Post Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act and subsequent NRF. However, the NRF still promoted a 
structured ICS as the preferred model for disaster response, and subsequently codified the 
ICS into an emergency response culture.  
The NRF defines the whole of community strategy and doctrine for building, 
sustaining, and delivering response core capabilities.320 According to the NRF: 
Once an incident occurs, efforts focus on saving lives, protecting property 
and the environment, and preserving the social, economic, cultural, and 
political structure of the jurisdiction. Depending on the size, scope, and 
magnitude of an incident, local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area 
governments, and, in some cases, the Federal Government, may be called 
to action.321 
E. VOLUNTEERS AND THE DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEM 
Despite the value that spontaneous volunteers bring to disaster response, 
government responders tend to view them as somewhat external to the disaster response 
system.322 While professional responders and affiliated volunteers tend to be viewed as 
part of the disaster response system, volunteers not affiliated with official organizations 
tend to be viewed as illegitimate, ineffective, and a nuisance to be managed.323 This 
sentiment is more prevalent among law enforcement that tends to view spontaneous 
volunteer response as “a crowd control problem.”324 Along this line of thinking, average 
 
319 Young, Coast Guard. 
320 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, 
DC: Disaster Research Center, 2016), 1, https://www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/2019-06/
national_response_framework.pdf. 
321 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 20. 
322 Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, “A Review of Informal Volunteerism in Emergencies and 
Disasters,” 360; Helsloot and Ruitenberg, “Citizen Response to Disasters.” 
323 Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, 360. 
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citizens can only gain legitimacy in the disaster response system by affiliating with a 
response organization prior to the disaster.  
In an attempt to incorporate volunteers into formal command and control processes, 
the federal government created organizations, such as the Citizen Corps and developed 
Citizen Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).325 The Citizen Corps is the DHS’s 
mechanism for citizens to volunteer; however, this volunteerism must be done through a 
sponsoring agency that defines the roles and responsibilities of the volunteers.326 
However, the role and function of the Citizen Corps is “ambiguous and fragmented,” and 
its training does not align with the professional emergency response disciplines, often 
causing questions about liability and capabilities during disasters.327 While these efforts 
do show that the disaster response system acknowledges the value that volunteers can 
provide, it remains focused on a formalized command and control system and expects 
volunteers to yield to ICS if they want to contribute to the response efforts.  
F. “BREAKING THE ICS MOLD”  
ICS was developed as a resource and task organization tool for managing wildfires, 
and in this context, is highly practical and very effective. Therefore, its adoption was 
implemented nationwide due to, “frustrations with incompatible systems across 
organizations.”328 However, more recent disaster management research has begun to 
question the application of ICS across the broad spectrum of disasters. Researchers Kendra 
and Wachtendorf argue that: 
The Incident Command System does not deliver a completely uniform 
compatible system in more decentralized, complex disasters … because 
improvised and emergent activity can’t be fully structured ahead of time. 
Instead, the Incident Command System works quite well in emergencies 
 
325 Casper, 2. 
326 Pamela Biladeau, “Strengthening and Expanding the Citizen Corps” (master’s thesis, Naval 
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where established responders are working with other established and 
expected responders.329 
Kendra and Wachtendorf go on to note, “the incident command system is basically, 
a tool for agencies to manage themselves.”330  
Furthermore, scholars Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre define the characteristics of an 
incident that is ideal for ICS as one that is small in nature, easily understood, resolved by 
established procedures, and lacks any emergent activity.331 Responding to a disaster 
involves the whole of community and is different from an emergency, in which government 
responders can handle the incident themselves, and find ICS useful to manage their 
interactions with each other.332 Disasters are complex and dynamic events and yet the 
disaster management system still chooses to respond to them using a rigid and inflexible 
command and control system. 
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